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Do Political Parties Matter for the Funding Status of State Pension Plans?

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  • Barth, James R.
  • Bolden, Nicholas
  • Joo, Sunghoon
  • Hilliard, Jitka

Abstract

Given the nancial troubles facing state pension plans in recent years, we examine determinants of the ratio of assets to liabilities, or the so-called \funded ratio," based on data for 148 pension plans from 2001 to 2013. The focus in this study is on whether politics plays a role in the extent to which pension plans are fully or less than fully funded. In particular, we consider whether both the political party of the governor and the majority political party of the state legislature are determinants of the funded ratio. We control for other factors that are also likely to be related to the funded ratio. We employ empirical techniques that are best suited to address potential econometric problems in the empirical work. In general, our results indicate that politics does indeed play a signicant role in explaining the funded ratios of state pension plans across the country.

Suggested Citation

  • Barth, James R. & Bolden, Nicholas & Joo, Sunghoon & Hilliard, Jitka, 2017. "Do Political Parties Matter for the Funding Status of State Pension Plans?," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 48(3), November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:jrapmc:339913
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.339913
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