Content
2011
- 77-96 Electoral Reform and Factional Politics in Italy and Japan
In: A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform
by Daniela Giannetti & Michael F. Thies - 81-106 Popular Sovereignty: A Case Study from the Antebellum Era
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Elizabeth Dale - 91-104 Lessons from In Situ Experiments during French Elections
In: In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
by Jean-François Laslier - 97-113 Conclusion
In: The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design
by Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward - 97-113 Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan: Unanticipated Outcomes?
In: A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform
by Ethan Scheiner & Filippo Tronconi - 99-124 Mutual Veto? How Coalitions Work
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Wolfgang C. Müller & Thomas M. Meyer - 105-121 Measuring Duvergerian Effects of the French Majority Runoff System with Laboratory Experiments: Duverger’s Laws Under the Microscope
In: In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
by Bernard Dolez & Annie Laurent - 107-119 Direct Democracy and the Constitution
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer & Susanne Neckerman - 121-134 Parallelisms and Paralogisms in the European Court of Justice
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Giuseppe Eusepi & Alessandra Cepparulo & Maurizio Intartaglia - 123-141 French Double Ballot Effects: American Experiments
In: In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
by Jill Wittrock & Michael S. Lewis-Beck - 125-143 Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945–1999
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Thomas Saalfeld - 135-153 The Dual Rationale of Judicial Independence
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Fabien Gélinas - 145-164 The Sources of Bipartisan Politics in Parliamentary Democracies
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Thomas Bräuninger & Marc Debus - 155-170 Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by George Tridimas - 165-186 Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Thomas König & Dirk Junge - 171-174 Making and Implementing the Rules of the Game: The Political Economy of Constitutional Myths and Rites
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Jean-Michel Josselin - 189-211 Testing the Law-Making Theories in a Parliamentary Democracy: A Roll Call Analysis of the Italian Chamber of Deputies (1988–2008)
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Luigi Curini & Francesco Zucchini - 213-230 Domestic Veto Players, Commission Monitoring and the Implementation of European Policy
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Bernard Steunenberg - 231-245 Strategic Voting in a Bicameral Setting
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Simon Hug - 247-265 Game Theoretic Models and the Empirical Analysis of EU Policy Making: Strategic Interaction, Collective Decisions, and Statistical Inference
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Dirk Junge - 269-283 Veto Players, Reform Processes and Policy Change: Concluding Remarks
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Thomas König & Marc Debus
2009
- 1-4 Introduction
In: Stifling Political Competition
by James T. Bennett - 1-11 Introduction: Evidence for Duverger's Law from Four Countries
In: Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting
by Bernard Grofman & Shaun Bowler & André Blais - 3-13 Theory
In: Democratic Governance and Economic Performance
by Dino Falaschetti - 3-15 Dissonance in Policy Processes: An Introduction
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Louis M. Imbeau - 5-22 The American Suspicion of Parties
In: Stifling Political Competition
by James T. Bennett - 13-25 Voting Strategically in Canada and Britain
In: Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting
by André Blais & Eugénie Dostie-Goulet & Marc André Bodet - 15-22 Natural Experiments
In: Democratic Governance and Economic Performance
by Dino Falaschetti - 19-29 The Power of Words: A Philosophical Perspective
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Thomas De Koninck - 23-48 Statistical Evidence
In: Democratic Governance and Economic Performance
by Dino Falaschetti - 23-55 No Competition Allowed or He Who Controls the Ballot Controls the Election
In: Stifling Political Competition
by James T. Bennett - 27-45 Neither Representative nor Accountable: First-Past-the-Post in Britain
In: Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting
by John Curtice - 31-51 Information Shrouding and the Governmental Supply of Goods and Services: An Economic Perspective
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Albert Breton - 47-64 Strategic Voting in the US
In: Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting
by Barry C. Burden & Philip Edward Jones - 51-68 Politics
In: Democratic Governance and Economic Performance
by Dino Falaschetti - 53-64 Party Rhetoric and Practice: A Normative Perspective from Political Science
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Vincent Lemieux - 57-77 Then Along Came FECA…
In: Stifling Political Competition
by James T. Bennett - 65-80 Measuring How Political Parties Keep Their Promises: A Positive Perspective from Political Science
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by François Pétry & Benoît Collette - 65-82 Mechanical Effects of Duverger’s Law in the United States
In: Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting
by Michael P. McDonald - 69-96 Law
In: Democratic Governance and Economic Performance
by Dino Falaschetti - 79-111 FECA: The Demopublicans’ Best Friend
In: Stifling Political Competition
by James T. Bennett - 83-96 Canada: The Puzzle of Local Three-Party Competition
In: Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting
by Richard Johnston & Fred Cutler - 83-107 Measuring US Presidents’ Political Commitment for Fiscal Discipline Between 1920 and 2008
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Francesc Pujol - 97-114 Party Inflation in India: Why Has a Multi-Party Format Prevailed in the National Party System?
In: Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting
by Csaba Nikolenyi - 97-116 Business
In: Democratic Governance and Economic Performance
by Dino Falaschetti - 109-129 Would You Trust an Italian Politician? Evidence from Italian Regional Politics
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Emma Galli & Veronica Grembi & Fabio Padovano - 113-126 The State Feeds the Party and the Party Feeds the State
In: Stifling Political Competition
by James T. Bennett - 115-134 Does the United Kingdom Obey Duverger's Law?
In: Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting
by Brian J. Gaines - 117-120 Conclusion
In: Democratic Governance and Economic Performance
by Dino Falaschetti - 127-135 Conclusion: Pulling the Plug?
In: Stifling Political Competition
by James T. Bennett - 131-154 General Policy Speech of Prime Ministers and Fiscal Choices in France: “Preach Water and Drink Wine!”
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Martial Foucault & Abel François - 135-146 The United States: A Case of Duvergerian Equilibrium
In: Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting
by Shaun Bowler & Bernard Grofman & André Blais - 155-166 Do Governments Manipulate Their Revenue Forecasts? Budget Speech and Budget Outcomes in the Canadian Provinces
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Jérôme Couture & Louis M. Imbeau - 167-184 Dissonance in Fiscal Policy: A Power Approach
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Louis M. Imbeau - 185-205 Speeches and Legislative Extremism in the U.S. Senate
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Jean François Godbout & Bei Yu - 207-221 Do Parties Matter? A Qualitative Answer with Numbers
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Jean Crête & Nouhoun Diallo - 223-240 Talking Like a Tax Collector or a Social Guardian? The Use of Administrative Discourse by U.S. State Lottery Agencies
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Étienne Charbonneau - 241-255 The Early European “FederalismFederalism ”: Ambiguities of Talks About How to Walk Toward a Political UnionPolitical Union
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano - 257-275 A Semiotic Network Comparison of Technocratic and Populist Discourses in Turkey
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Ahmet K. Süerdem - 279-290 Do They Walk Like They Talk? A Conclusion
In: Do They Walk Like They Talk?
by Louis M. Imbeau & Steve Jacob & François Pétrys