Content
December 1990, Volume 67, Issue 3
- 201-211 On Democracy and Debt
by Balkan, Erol M & Greene, Kenneth V - 213-226 The Bias in Centrally Planned Prices
by Levy, David M - 227-242 Are Economic Statistics Overproduced?
by Gillespie, Stephen - 243-256 Instrument Choice, Political Reform and Economic Welfare
by Hahn, Robert W - 257-268 An Alternative to "A Public Choice Theory of the Great Contraction."
by Huberman, Douglas A - 269-275 The Ruthless Fed: A Critique of the AST Hypothesis
by Santoni, G J & Van Cott, T Norman - 277-283 A Public Choice Theory of the Great Contraction: Further Evidence
by Anderson, Gary M & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D - 285-291 The Effect of Rent-Seeking on Family Income Levels: Some Suggestive Empirical Evidence
by Durden, Garey
November 1990, Volume 67, Issue 2
- 101-110 Protectionist Policies as the Regulation of International Industry
by Hillman, Arye L - 111-128 Allocation Patterns of PAC Monies: The U.S. Senate
by Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C & Torrent, Gary M - 129-154 On the Limits to Rent-Seeking Waste
by Delorme, Charles D, Jr & Snow, Arthur - 155-167 Family Ties and Social Security in a Democracy
by Breyer, Friedrich & von der Schulenburg, J-Matthias Graf - 169-179 Bureaucracy, Inefficiency, and Time
by Wyckoff, Paul Gary - 181-189 The Optimal Subsidization of Baptists by Bootleggers
by Shogren, Jason F
October 1990, Volume 67, Issue 1
- 1-9 Boards of Trustees, Agency Problems, and University Output
by Toma, Eugenia Froedge - 11-33 Shirking, Representation, and Congressional Behavior: Voting on the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act
by Richardson, Lilliard E, Jr & Munger, Michael C - 35-47 The Simple Analytics of Slack-Maximizing Bureaucracy
by Wyckoff, Paul Gary - 49-63 Pressure Politics and Government Spending in Belgium
by Naert, Frank - 65-79 Economic Performance and Political Popularity in the Republic of Ireland
by Borooah, Vani K & Borooah, Vidya - 81-86 A Constitutional View of Legislative Pay
by Sollars, David L - 87-89 A Brief Empirical Note on the Tiebout Hypothesis and State Income Tax Policies
by Cebula, Richard J
September 1990, Volume 66, Issue 3
- 201-227 Committees and the Core of the Constitution
by Miller, Gary J & Hammond, Thomas H - 229-242 The Pits and the Core: Simple Collective Decision Problems with Concave Preferences
by Laing, James D & Slotznick, Benjamin - 243-251 The Structure of the Banks Set
by Miller, Nicholas R & Grofman, Bernard & Feld, Scott L - 253-259 Probability Calculations for Transitivity of Simple Majority Rule with Anonymous Voters
by Gehrlein, William V - 261-278 General Fund Financing versus Earmarked Taxes: An Alternative Model of Budgetary Choice in a Democracy
by Athanassakos, Alex - 279-291 Collective Decision Making and the Limits on the Organization's Size
by Gradstein, Mark & Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob - 293-299 Power Indices and Probabilistic Voting Assumptions
by Leech, Dennis
August 1990, Volume 66, Issue 2
- 101-116 Invisible Decisive Coalitions in Large Hierarchies
by Hammond, Thomas H & Thomas, Paul A - 117-136 The Economic Approach to Political Behavior: Governors, Bureaucrats, and Cost Commissions
by McBride, Mark E - 137-153 Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade Votes
by Nollen, Stanley D & Iglarsh, Harvey J - 155-159 Historical Considerations, Property Rights, and Budgets: A Comment on the Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve
by Mounts, W Stewart, Jr & Sowell, Clifford - 161-175 The Theory of Economic Regulation and Public Choice and the Determinants of Public Sector Bargaining Legislation
by Waters, Melissa & Moore, William J - 177-182 The Determinants of Public Sector Bargaining Legislation: Comment
by Reid, Joseph D, Jr & Kurth, Michael M - 183-188 The Determinants of the Choice between Public and Private Production of a Publicly Funded Service Reconsidered
by Pack, Janet Rothenberg - 189-194 More on the Choice between Public and Private Production of a Publicly Funded Service
by McGuire, Robert A & Ohsfeldt, Robert L & Van Cott, T Norman
July 1990, Volume 66, Issue 1
- 1-13 Asymmetric Causality between Federal Spending and Tax Changes: Avoiding a Fiscal Loss
by Blackley, Paul R - 15-36 On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice Perspective
by Crew, Michael A & Twight, Charlotte - 37-50 Why Is There a Seniority System? To Solve an Agency Problem
by Davis, Michael L - 51-66 Dynamic Optimization of Political Popularity in an Empirical Macroeconomic Model
by Guttman, Joel M & Shachmurove, Yochanan - 67-77 On the Social Costs of Rent-Seeking versus the Social Costs of Production Flexibility
by Katz, Eliakim & Smith, J Barry - 79-81 On the Social Costs of Rent-Seeking versus the Social Costs of Production Flexibility: Comment
by Tullock, Gordon - 83-88 Rent-Seeking and Perestroika
by Schuknecht, Ludger - 89-97 The Role of Credible Commitments in State Finance: Review Article
by Weingast, Barry R
June 1990, Volume 65, Issue 3
- 201-216 The Rational Timing of Parliamentary Elections
by Balke, Nathan S - 217-227 Government and Growth: Cross-sectional Evidence
by Grossman, Philip J - 229-237 Can Rents Run Uphill? A Note on the Theory of Regulation
by High, Jack - 239-256 Executive Veto and Spending Limitation: Positive Political Economy with Implications for Institutional Choice
by Schap, David - 257-266 Leadership and Expenditures in Rent-Seeking Models
by Smith, J Barry & Weber, Shlomo - 267-271 Can Reallocation of Rights Help to Avoid the Paretian Liberal Paradox?
by Breyer, Friedrich - 273-279 University Admission Requirements as Rent-Seeking
by Steindl, Frank G - 281-286 Vote Buying in a Stylized Setting: Comment
by Abraham, Darryn - 287-289 Vote Buying in a Stylized Setting: Reply
by Buchanan, James M & Lee, Dwight R
May 1990, Volume 65, Issue 2
- 101-141 An Analysis of Contributions and Contributors to Public Choice and the Journal of Law and Economics; 1973-1987
by Durden, Garey C & Marlin, James - 143-156 Inflation Drag or Taxation in Drag: Responsible for the Rising Share of Government in Australian GDP?
by Swan, Peter L - 157-165 Tollison Costs and Technological Innovation: The Case of Environmental Regulation
by Abbott, Alden F & Brady, Gordon L - 167-180 The Last Period Problem in Politics: Do Congressional Representatives Not Subject to a Reelection Constraint Alter Their Voting Behavior?
by Zupan, Mark A - 181-187 Professional Associations and the Free Rider Problem: The Case of Optometry
by Kilbane, Sally Conway & Beck, John H - 189-193 Third Party Voting and the Rational Voter Model: Empirical Evidence from Recent Presidential Elections
by Chressanthis, George A
April 1990, Volume 65, Issue 1
- 1-19 Executive Budget Proposal, Executive Veto, Legislative Override, and Uncertainty: A Comparative Analysis of the Budgetary Process
by Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A - 21-47 The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a Unifying Framework
by Hahn, Robert W - 49-60 Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods
by Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob - 61-83 The Layered Prisoners' Dilemma: Ingroup versus Macro-efficiency
by Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Simmons, Randy T - 85-91 Decentralizing an Economy: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption in China's Economic Reforms
by Sands, Barbara N
March 1990, Volume 64, Issue 3
- 201-212 The Impact of Citizen Influence on Local Government Expenditure
by Farnham, Paul G - 213-227 Efficient Use of Reference Group Cues in a Single Dimension
by Grofman, Bernard & Norrander, Barbara - 229-238 Multi-party Competition with Exit: A Comment of Duverger's Law
by Humes, Brian D - 239-251 Fiscal Variables and Growth: A Cross-Sectional Analysis
by Martin, Ricardo & Fardmanesh, Mohsen - 253-264 State Lotteries as Duopoly Transfer Mechanisms
by Martin, Robert & Yandle, Bruce - 265-277 Cycle Avoiding Trajectories, Strategic Agendas, and the Duality of Memory and Foresight: An Informal Exposition
by Miller, Nicholas R & Grofman, Bernard & Feld, Scott L - 279-290 Efficient Renk-Seeking under Varying Cost Structures
by Paul, Chris & Wilhite, Al - 291-297 Investments in Rent-Seeking
by Godwin, R Kenneth
February 1990, Volume 64, Issue 2
- 103-120 The Political Market for Real Income Redistribution through Choice of the Weights in COLAS
by Basmann, Robert L & Diamond, Charles A. & Scully, Gerald & Slottje, Daniel - 121-134 Economic Effects of a Conflict-Prone World Order
by Cowen, Tyler - 135-153 Redistributive Politics: A Theory of Taxation for an Incumbent in a Democracy
by Frohlich, Norman & Oppenheimer, Joe - 155-165 Determinants of the U.S. Wheat Producer Support Price: Do Presidential Elections Matter?
by Von Witzke, Harald - 167-177 Reform City Councils and Municipal Employees
by Zax, Jeffrey S - 179-184 Demand Revealing--Two Minor Notes
by Tullock, Gordon - 185-190 Bureaucratic Behavior and the Choice of Labor Input: A Study of Municipal Governments
by Zardkoohi, Asghar & Giroux, Gary
January 1990, Volume 64, Issue 1
- 1-20 The Power of the Proposal Maker in a Model of Endogenous Agenda Formation
by Harrington, Joseph E, Jr - 21-41 Susceptibility to Manipulation
by Saari, Donald G - 43-55 Admissible and Sincere Strategies under Approval Voting
by Carter, Cyril - 57-71 Efficacy in Small Electorates under Plurality and Approval Voting
by Rapoport, Amnon & Felsenthal, Dan S - 73-92 The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: The Effects of a Caucus
by Berg, Sven - 93-100 Monopoly, Price Discrimination, and Rent-Seeking
by Kahana, Nava & Katz, Eliakim - 101-102 A Note on Nanson's Rule: A Note
by Fishburn, P C
December 1989, Volume 63, Issue 3
- 201-219 Campaign spending and Senate elections, 1978–84
by Kevin Grier - 221-235 Fiscal illusion, budget maximizers, and dynamic equilibrium
by Robert Logan & J. O'Brien - 237-252 Looking beyond reelection: Revising assumptions about the factors motivating congressional behavior
by Glenn Parker - 253-265 Intercity competition and the size of the local public work force
by Mark Schneider - 267-277 Initiatives and government expenditures
by Jeffrey Zax - 279-281 Further thoughts on rent-seeking, bureaucratic output, and the price of complements
by Bruce Benson - 283-292 Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective
by William Mitchell - 293-297 Chicago Political Economy
by Robert Tollison - 299-300 Book review
by Randall Holcombe
November 1989, Volume 63, Issue 2
- 101-112 Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success
by Jack Hirshleifer - 113-123 The determinants of off-budget activity of state and local governments
by Michael Marlow & David Joulfaian - 125-147 Competition of newspapers and the location of political parties
by Norbert Schulz & Joachim Weimann - 149-164 The size of the state, economic growth and the efficient utilization of national resources
by Gerald Scully - 165-174 Nonprofit organizations: Revised theory and new evidence
by Edwin West - 175-181 Do legislators' votes reflect constituency preference? A simple way to evaluate the Senate
by Robert Higgs - 183-200 Book reviews
by Daniel McMillen & William Niskanen & Wayne Brough & Geoffrey Brennan & Gordon Tullock & Van Kolpin & Loren Lomasky & Peter Aranson & Joe Head & Thomas Dye & John Dryzek
October 1989, Volume 63, Issue 1
- 1-14 A democratic model of the “rent-sought” benefit cycle
by Michael Beenstock - 15-41 Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats
by Jan Brueckner & Kevin O'Brien - 43-61 Legitimacy as a capital asset of the state
by Giulio Gallarotti - 63-72 Political instability in Africa: A rent-seeking approach
by John Mbaku & Chris Paul - 73-78 Monopoly power and monitoring: A test using the Gonzalez and Mehay model
by Gary Giroux - 79-86 Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas
by William Kaempfer & Thomas Willett - 87-91 Nonconventional costs of rent-seeking: X-inefficiency in the political process
by E. Pasour - 93-100 Reviews
by Brian Goff & Charles Rowley & William Mitchell
September 1989, Volume 62, Issue 3
- 201-215 Religion, liberty and economic development: An empirical investigation
by Fred Glahe & Frank Vorhies - 217-236 The assurance problem in a laboratory market
by R. Isaac & David Schmidtz & James Walker - 237-251 The state of nature in the shadow of contract formation: Adding a missing link to J.M. Buchanan's social contract theory
by Hans-Jörg Schmidt-Trenz - 253-285 “Relational goods” and participation: Incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action
by Carole Uhlaner - 287-293 Monopoly deregulation in the presence of Tullock activities
by Raul Fabella - 295-300 Reviews
by A. Schmid & Michael Cain & Paul Abramson
August 1989, Volume 62, Issue 2
- 101-118 Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy
by Roger Congleton - 119-138 Concealed takings: Capture and rent-seeking in the Indian Sugar Industry
by Shyam Kamath - 139-151 An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking
by Edward Millner & Michael Pratt - 155-172 The evolution of economic institutions as a propagation process
by Ulrich Witt - 173-179 Political successions and the growth of government
by Mwangi Kimenyi & William Shughart - 181-186 A simple test of the thesis that committee jurisdictions shape corporate PAC contributions
by Michael Munger - 187-190 Does transferability affect the social costs of licensing?
by Asghar Zardkoohi & Michael Pustay
July 1989, Volume 62, Issue 1
- 1-13 The retention of state governors
by James Adams & Lawrence Kenny - 15-24 The determinants of minimum wage rates
by André Blais & Jean-Michel Cousineau & Kenneth McRoberts - 25-39 Explaining collective action with rational models
by David Goetze & Peter Galderisi - 41-61 Interest group demand for taxation
by William Hunter & Michael Nelson - 63-69 Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension
by Philip Grossman - 71-77 Bureaucracy, publicness and local government expenditures revisited: Comment
by Rodolfo Gonzalez & Roger Folsom & Stephen Mehay - 79-82 Bureaucracy and the ‘publicness’ of local public goods: A reply to Gonzalez, Folsom and Mehay
by Paul Wyckoff - 83-87 Less than unanimous agreement on the reason for unanimous agreement: Comment
by Dwight Lee - 89-92 Non-optimal unanimous agreement under majority rule: Reply
by Randall Holcombe - 93-100 Book reviews
by Mark Toma & G. Choate & William Mitchell & Michael Munger & Randall Holcombe & Donald Wittman
June 1989, Volume 61, Issue 3
- 201-216 Economic policy advice and political preferences
by Peter Coughlin - 217-228 Declining electoral competitiveness in the House of Representatives: The differential impact of improved transportation technology
by Douglas Hart & Michael Munger - 229-245 Government size, productivity, and economic growth: The post-war experience
by Edgar Peden & Michael Bradley - 247-260 Will bounty-hunting revenue agents increase enforcement?
by Mark Toma - 261-267 The presence of moral hazard in budget breaking
by Martin Gaynor - 269-275 On the economic incentives for taking bribes
by Rajeev Goel & Daniel Rich - 277-284 The impossibility of a desirable minimal state
by Dwight Lee - 285-288 A note on seniority and political competition
by Randall Holcombe
May 1989, Volume 61, Issue 2
- 101-113 A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections
by James Enelow & Melvin Hinich - 115-125 The median voter model in public choice theory
by Randall Holcombe - 127-140 Niskanen effects in the California Community Colleges
by Shirley Kress - 141-152 On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option
by Dwight Lee & Todd Sandler - 153-166 Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents
by J. Smith & Shlomo Weber - 167-169 Nuclear consequences of the welfare state revisited: Danger in the data
by Robert Ayanian - 171-176 Welfare policies and migration of the poor in the United States: An empirical note
by Richard Cebula & James Koch - 177-181 The Tullock-Bastiat hypothesis and Rawlsian distribution strategies
by Lowell Gallaway & Richard Vedder - 183-186 Production costs and deregulation
by John Lott & Morgan Reynolds - 187-192 Constitutional order in a federal republic
by Richard Wagner
April 1989, Volume 61, Issue 1
- 1-13 The selection of public utility commissioners: A re-examination of the importance of institutional setting
by William Boyes & John McDowell - 15-27 A theory of leadership and deference in constitutional construction
by James Buchanan & Viktor Vanberg - 29-39 Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not
by Amihai Glazer & Bernard Grofman - 41-74 Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution
by Timur Kuran - 75-96 Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians
by John Lott & W. Reed - 97-98 Superdissipation
by Robert Tollison
March 1989, Volume 60, Issue 3
- 201-210 The Calculus of Consent: Enduring contributions to public choice and political science
by William Mitchell - 211-239 Disposable income, unemployment, inflation and state spending in a dynamic political-economic model
by F. Ploeg - 241-257 Putting the puzzle together: Why people join public interest groups
by Lawrence Rothenberg - 259-282 Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior
by Arthur Schram & Frans Winden - 283-291 Earmarking as a deterrent to rent-seeking
by Thomas Wyrick & Roger Arnold - 293-298 Reviews
by Vincent Ostrom & Viktor Vanberg & Robert Tollison
February 1989, Volume 60, Issue 2
- 101-111 A test for pure or apparent ideology in congressional voting
by Michael Davis & Philip Porter - 113-121 Rent-seeking in arts policy
by William Grampp - 123-132 The stability of stated preferences for public goods: Evidence from recent budget games
by Hans Groot & Evert Pommer - 133-144 Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation: Preliminary results for 20 countries
by Eliakim Katz & Jacob Rosenberg - 145-154 Representative versus direct democracy: Are there any expenditure differences?
by Rexford Santerre - 155-175 Plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates
by Stephen Wright & William Riker - 177-184 Equilibrium employment of inputs by a rent-seeking firm
by David Levy - 185-191 Constituencies, ideology, and the demand for abortion legislation
by Marshall Medoff - 193-199 Reviews
by Randall Holcombe & P. Hill & Randy Simmons
January 1989, Volume 60, Issue 1
- 3-29 The rationally uninformed electorate: Some experimental evidence
by Kenneth Collier & Peter Ordeshook & Kenneth Williams - 31-39 Conjectural variations and the nature of equilibrium in rent-seeking models
by Robert Michaels - 41-54 Public employees in political firms: Part B. Civil service and militancy
by Joseph Reid & Michael Kurth - 55-70 The paradox of politics and policy in redistributing income
by Gerald Scully & D. Slottje - 71-85 The public's indifference map between inflation and unemployment: Empirical evidence for the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan presidencies
by David Smyth & Pami Dua - 87-92 Budget deficits and interest rates in the United States
by Kanhaya Gupta - 93-97 More on budget deficits and interest rates in the United States
by Richard Cebula
December 1988, Volume 59, Issue 3
- 205-214 The use of inputs by the Federal Reserve System: An extended model
by Stuart Allen & Donald McCrickard & Phillip Cartwright & Charles Delorme - 215-224 Rent-seeking and second best economics
by Mahmudul Anam & Eliakim Katz - 225-238 Fiscal expansion and political instability in the Iberic-Latin region
by Alfred Cuzán & Stephanie Moussalli & Charles Bundrick - 239-252 Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making
by Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman - 253-262 Public employees in political firms: Part A. The patronage era
by Joseph Reid & Michael Kurth - 263-275 Antitrust actions and the budgeting process
by Bruce Yandle - 277-285 Expenditures and receipts in state and local government finances: Comment
by Abdur Chowdhury - 287-290 Expenditures and receipts in state and local government finances: Reply
by Michael Marlow & Neela Manage
November 1988, Volume 59, Issue 2
- 101-120 The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems
by Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen - 121-131 The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
by Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn & Samuel Merrill - 133-147 Is approval voting an ‘unmitigated evil’?: A response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill
by Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen - 151-165 Proportional representation: An empirical evaluation of single-stage, non-ranked voting procedures
by Amnon Rapoport & Dan Felsenthal & Zeev Maoz - 167-176 The Borda count in n-dimensional issue space
by Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman - 177-194 Is vote-selling desirable?
by Jeffrey Weiss - 195-202 The distribution of income, incomplete information and the rank and Pareto criteria
by Rubin Saposnik
October 1988, Volume 59, Issue 1
- 3-23 A public choice theory of the great contraction
by Gary Anderson & William Shughart & Robert Tollison - 25-36 Rent-seeking and optimal regulation in replenishable resource industries
by Eliakim Katz & J. Smith - 37-50 Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk
by Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman & Nicholas Miller - 51-66 Theory of competitive regulatory equilibrium
by John Goodman & Philip Porter