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Content
January 2010, Volume 68, Issue 1
- 242-254 Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
by Kim, Chongmin & Wong, Kam-Chau
- 255-274 Moral norms in a partly compliant society
by Kranz, Sebastian
- 275-302 Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
by Maniquet, François & Sprumont, Yves
- 303-324 Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment
by Ramsza, Michal & Seymour, Robert M.
- 325-338 Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context
by Rode, Julian
- 339-352 Attribution and reciprocity
by Sebald, Alexander
- 353-375 Public information and electoral bias
by Taylor, Curtis R. & Yildirim, Huseyin
- 376-380 On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël & Rajan, Uday
- 381-388 Polytopes and the existence of approximate equilibria in discontinuous games
by Carmona, Guilherme
- 389-402 Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure
by Chen, Yi-Chun
- 403-410 The possibility of impossible stairways: Tail events and countable player sets
by Voorneveld, Mark
- 411-411 Behavioral & Quantitative Game Theory Conference on Future Directions May 14-16, 2010, Fairmont Hotel, Newport Beach, CA
by Dror, Moshe & Sosic, Greys
November 2009, Volume 67, Issue 2
- 335-350 Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
by Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G.
- 351-362 Categorizing others in a large game
by Azrieli, Yaron
- 363-375 Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
by Barelli, Paulo
- 376-388 Cooperation through imitation
by Bergin, James & Bernhardt, Dan
- 389-398 Games played in a contracting environment
by Bhaskar, V.
- 399-407 Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
by Engelmann, Dirk & Fischbacher, Urs
- 408-427 Subjective states: A more robust model
by Epstein, Larry G. & Seo, Kyoungwon
- 428-444 Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
by Freixas, Josep & Zwicker, William S.
- 445-466 In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Riedl, Arno & Ule, Aljaz
- 467-480 Reciprocity and voting
by Hahn, Volker
- 481-502 Self-reinforcing market dominance
by Halbheer, Daniel & Fehr, Ernst & Goette, Lorenz & Schmutzler, Armin
- 503-525 Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Rêgo, Leandro C.
- 526-541 Farsightedly stable networks
by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent
- 542-551 Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability
by Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph
- 552-568 Status, affluence, and inequality: Rank-based comparisons in games of status
by Hopkins, Ed & Kornienko, Tatiana
- 569-583 Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
by Lagunoff, Roger
- 584-597 Contests with a stochastic number of players
by Lim, Wooyoung & Matros, Alexander
- 598-610 A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game
by Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles
- 611-615 Sequential, nonzero-sum "Blotto": Allocating defensive resources prior to attack
by Powell, Robert
- 616-632 Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test
by Rutström, E. Elisabet & Wilcox, Nathaniel T.
- 633-644 On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
by Shellshear, Evan & Sudhölter, Peter
- 645-664 Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences
by Shunda, Nicholas
- 665-681 Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
by Suvorov, Anton & van de Ven, Jeroen
- 682-694 Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
by Tomala, Tristan
- 695-707 Cost sharing with multiple technologies
by Trudeau, Christian
- 708-719 The target projection dynamic
by Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark
- 720-735 Fully sincere voting
by Wolitzky, Alexander
- 736-744 Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
by Guembel, Alexander & Rossetto, Silvia
- 745-749 Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
by Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito
- 750-757 Weighted congestion games with separable preferences
by Milchtaich, Igal
September 2009, Volume 67, Issue 1
- 1-1 Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
by Parkes, David C. & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 2-21 Mediators in position auctions
by Ashlagi, Itai & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 22-35 Congestion games with malicious players
by Babaioff, Moshe & Kleinberg, Robert & Papadimitriou, Christos H.
- 36-50 Trading networks with price-setting agents
by Blume, Lawrence E. & Easley, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Tardos, Éva
- 51-68 Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
by Epstein, Amir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay
- 69-98 Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
by Guo, Mingyu & Conitzer, Vincent
- 99-124 Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
by Lavi, Ron & Swamy, Chaitanya
- 125-155 Beyond Moulin mechanisms
by Mehta, Aranyak & Roughgarden, Tim & Sundararajan, Mukund
- 156-173 Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources
by Penn, Michal & Polukarov, Maria & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 174-190 Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
by Sharma, Yogeshwer & Williamson, David P.
- 191-216 Elections with platform and valence competition
by Ashworth, Scott & Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan
- 217-232 Membership in citizen groups
by Barbieri, Stefano & Mattozzi, Andrea
- 233-244 Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-level experiment
by Bellemare, Charles & Shearer, Bruce
- 245-252 Competitive environments and protective behavior
by Borm, Peter & Estévez-Fernández, Arantza & Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria
- 253-265.3 Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods
by Botelho, Anabela & Harrison, Glenn W. & Pinto, Lígia M. Costa & Rutström, Elisabet E.
- 266-276 Stable allocations of risk
by Csóka, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á.
- 277-291 The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments
by Fong, Yuk-fai & Surti, Jay
- 292-299 Private provision of discrete public goods
by Makris, Miltiadis
- 300-314 Indifference and incompleteness distinguished by rational trade
by Mandler, Michael
- 315-330 Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit
by Virág, Gábor
- 331-333 On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets
by Stamatopoulos, Giorgos & Tauman, Tami
July 2009, Volume 66, Issue 2
- 581-581 In memoriam: David Gale (1921-2008)
by Sobel, Joel & von Stengel, Bernhard
- 582-593 The Berkeley Memorial
by Weinstein, Alan & Kuhn, Harold & Goodman, Leo A. & McFadden, Dan & Sobel, Joel & Adler, Ilan & Feldman, Jacob & Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, Katharine & Dunning, Elizabeth & Watkiss, Samara & Gilbert, Roger & Birt, Jonathan & Ingham, Graham & Gilbert, Sandra M.
- 594-597 David Gale in Paris
by Balinski, Michel & Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvan
- 598-598 The Galetron
by Berlekamp, Elwyn
- 599-599 More Gale Tales
by Brock, William A. Buz
- 600-600 Sex and the mathematician: The High School Prom Theorem
by Davis, Martin
- 601-602 David in Paris
by Demange, Gabrielle
- 603-605 Two lemmas that changed general equilibrium theory
by Florenzano, Monique
- 606-606 My memories of David Gale
by Karp, Richard
- 607-626 Equilibrium and optimality: Some imprints of David Gale
by Majumdar, Mukul
- 627-627 Gale at Princeton
by Nash Jr., John F.
- 628-629 Remembering David Gale
by Osserman, Robert
- 630-631 My introduction to top-trading cycles
by Scarf, Herbert
- 632-642 ReGale: Some memorable results
by Sobel, Joel
- 643-646 My encounters with David Gale
by Sotomayor, Marilda
- 647-656 Topological games at Princeton, a mathematical memoir
by Gale, David
- 660-684 Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
by Babaioff, Moshe & Nisan, Noam & Pavlov, Elan
- 685-707 On the benefits of party competition
by Bernhardt, Dan & Campuzano, Larissa & Squintani, Francesco & Câmara, Odilon
- 708-720 Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
by Bhaskar, V.
- 721-728 Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
by Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar
- 729-741 All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction
by Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul & Lafky, Jonathan & Münster, Johannes & Zhang, Meixia
- 742-748 The aggregate-monotonic core
by Calleja, Pedro & Rafels, Carles & Tijs, Stef
- 749-760 Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection
by Carmona, Guilherme & Fajardo, José
- 761-774 Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints
by Conley, John P. & Neilson, William
- 775-784 Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games
by De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos
- 785-812 Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
by Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack
- 813-829 Equilibrium vengeance
by Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar
- 830-840 When curiosity kills the profits: An experimental examination
by Jamison, Julian & Karlan, Dean S.
- 841-854 Repeated signaling games
by Kaya, Ayça
- 855-864 Auctions in which losers set the price
by Mezzetti, Claudio & Tsetlin, Ilia
- 865-879 Rapid evolution under inertia
by Norman, Thomas W.L.
- 880-892 A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
by Özyurt, Selçuk & Sanver, M. Remzi
- 893-919 Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets
by Picard, Pierre
- 920-927 Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games
by Pimienta, Carlos
- 928-949 Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
by Pitchik, Carolyn
- 950-958 A general structure theorem for the Nash equilibrium correspondence
by Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- 959-978 Strategic complementarities and search market equilibrium
by Rauh, Michael T.
- 979-994 Informational externalities and emergence of consensus
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas
- 995-1004 Approachability with bounded memory
by Lehrer, Ehud & Solan, Eilon
May 2009, Volume 66, Issue 1
- 1-26 Price and capacity competition
by Acemoglu, Daron & Bimpikis, Kostas & Ozdaglar, Asuman
- 27-38 Non-hyperbolic time inconsistency
by Bleichrodt, Han & Rohde, Kirsten I.M. & Wakker, Peter P.
- 39-56 Communication networks with endogenous link strength
by Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar
- 57-77 Disputed lands
by Dall'Aglio, Marco & Maccheroni, Fabio
- 78-97 Bargaining over bets
by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
- 98-114 Random matching in adaptive dynamics
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A.
- 115-125 Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
by Epstein, Amir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay
- 126-145 Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
by Flesch, János & Perea, Andrés
- 146-161 The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests
by Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng
- 162-190 Tournaments with midterm reviews
by Gershkov, Alex & Perry, Motty
- 191-201 Deterministic approximation of best-response dynamics for the Matching Pennies game
by Gorodeisky, Ziv
- 202-220 Cooperation in viscous populations--Experimental evidence
by Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike
- 221-237 Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
by Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan
- 238-255 Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
by Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu
- 256-274 Multi-battle contests
by Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan
- 275-291 Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
by Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K.
- 292-314 Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
by Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu
- 315-325 Approachability in repeated games: Computational aspects and a Stackelberg variant
by Mannor, Shie & Tsitsiklis, John N.
- 326-347 Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
by Mishra, Debasis & Parkes, David C.
- 348-372 Network architecture and traffic flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes
by Morgan, John & Orzen, Henrik & Sefton, Martin
- 373-393 Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab
by Müller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi & Yehezkel, Yaron
- 394-403 A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences
by Neilson, William S.
- 404-425 Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall
by Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro
- 426-461 The game motoneurons play
by Nowik, Irit
- 462-487 Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
by Page Jr., Frank H. & Wooders, Myrna
- 488-505 Commitment games
by Renou, Ludovic
- 506-525 Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments--An experimental study
by Sutter, Matthias & Strassmair, Christina
- 526-545 Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
by Tian, Guoqiang
- 546-558 Random assignment under weak preferences
by YIlmaz, Özgür
- 559-565 Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
by Kóczy, László Á.
- 566-575 Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
by Triossi, Matteo
March 2009, Volume 65, Issue 2
- 289-317 Strong price of anarchy
by Andelman, Nir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay
- 318-338 Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
by Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas
- 339-371 Aggregation of expert opinions
by Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 372-405 Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
- 406-429 Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case
by Hofbauer, Josef & Oechssler, Jörg & Riedel, Frank
- 430-460 Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
by Larson, Nathan
- 461-502 Imitation and luck: An experimental study on social sampling
by Offerman, Theo & Schotter, Andrew
- 503-515 Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans
- 516-537 Moderation of an ideological party
by Pokladniková, Vlasta & Yildiz, Muhamet
- 538-571 Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess Paradox
by Rapoport, Amnon & Kugler, Tamar & Dugar, Subhasish & Gisches, Eyran J.
- 572-585 Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games
by Rey-Biel, Pedro
- 586-625 Contracts with endogenous information
by Szalay, Dezsö
- 626-643 Learning by trial and error
by Young, H. Peyton
- 644-648 A note on equivalence of consistency and bilateral consistency through converse consistency
by Driessen, Theo & Hu, Cheng-Cheng
- 649-649 Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society
by Hart, Sergiu
January 2009, Volume 65, Issue 1
- 1-6 Introduction to the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Martin Shubik
by Amir, Rabah & Aumann, Robert J. & Peck, James & Wooders, Myrna
- 7-24 Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
by Amir, Rabah & Bloch, Francis
- 25-48 Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values
by Araujo, Aloisio & de Castro, Luciano I.
- 49-61 Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
by Casajus, André
- 62-82 Price-quantity competition with varying toughness
by d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe
- 83-104 The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
by Demange, Gabrielle
- 105-123 Games of status and discriminatory contracts
by Dhillon, Amrita & Herzog-Stein, Alexander
- 124-141 Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)
by Dubey, Pradeep & Sondermann, Dieter
- 142-175 Cournot equilibrium without apology: Existence and the Cournot inverse demand function
by Grilo, Isabel & Mertens, Jean-François
- 176-204 If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design
by Grosskopf, Brit & Roth, Alvin E.
- 205-219 Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games
by Guardiola, Luis A. & Meca, Ana & Puerto, Justo
- 220-233 Walrasian analysis via two-player games
by Hervés-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno-García, Emma
- 234-241 Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking
by Koutsougeras, Leonidas C.
- 242-255 Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index
by Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico
- 256-269 First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution
by Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
- 270-286 Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes
by Páscoa, Mário Rui & Seghir, Abdelkrim
- 287-287 Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society
by Hart, Sergiu
- 288-288 A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler
by Zamir, Shmuel & Barbera, Salvador
November 2008, Volume 64, Issue 2
- 351-351 In memoriam: Michael B. Maschler (1927-2008)
by Kalai, Ehud
- 352-354 In memory of my father
by Maschler, Yael
- 355-360 Working with Mike
by Aumann, Robert J.
- 361-362 Michael Maschler in Barcelona
by Barberà, Salvador
- 363-363 The mentor
by Billera, Louis J.
- 364-364 My referee and collaborator
by Granot, Daniel
- 365-366 A mathematics teacher
by Gura, Ein-Ya
- 367-367 Michael's questions
by Hart, Sergiu
- 368-368 An advocate of cooperative theory
by Moulin, Herve
- 369-369 Helping young game theorists
by Owen, Guillermo
- 370-371 My joint work with Michael Maschler
by Peleg, Bezalel
- 372-372 Michael Maschler in The Netherlands
by Potters, Jos & Tijs, S.
- 373-373 Michael Maschler at the Center for the Study of Rationality
by Shemesh, Hana
- 374-374 In memory of Michael Maschler
by Shubik, Martin
- 375-375 Learning from Michael Maschler and working with him
by Solan, Eilon
- 376-377 Michael Maschler, a special friend
by Sotomayor, Marilda
- 378-379 Michael Maschler: My lost migration compass
by Stark, Oded
- 380-380 Michael Maschler in Bilbao
by Valenciano, Federico
- 381-381 In memory of Michael Maschler
by Wooders, Myrna
- 382-382 Michael Maschler, game theory, and the Talmud
by Peyton Young, H.
- 383-384 Teacher, colleague and coauthor
by Zamir, Shmuel
- 385-387 Biographical information: Michael B. Maschler
by Zamir, Shmuel
- 393-420 Majority rule when voters like to win
by Callander, Steven
- 421-432 Of mice and men: Within gender variation in strategic behavior
by Castillo, Marco E. & Cross, Philip J.
- 433-456 Informed principal with correlation
by Cella, Michela
- 457-469 A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games
by Correa, José R. & Schulz, Andreas S. & Stier-Moses, Nicolás E.
- 470-486 The [alpha]-beauty contest: Choosing numbers, thinking intervals
by De Giorgi, Enrico & Reimann, Stefan
- 487-513 Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
by Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei
- 514-532 The strategic Marshallian cross
by Dickson, Alex & Hartley, Roger
- 533-547 Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
by Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton
- 548-564 Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow
by Hausken, Kjell
- 565-590 The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games
by Lahkar, Ratul & Sandholm, William H.