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Overprotected Politicians

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  • Bruno S. Frey

Abstract

This paper argues that politicians are overprotected. The costs of political assassination differ systematically depending on whether a private or a public point of view is taken. A politician attributes a very high (if not infinite) cost to his or her survival. The social cost of political assassination is much smaller as politicians are replaceable. Conversely, the private cost of the security measures is low for politicians, its bulk � including time loss and inconvenience � is imposed on taxpayers and the general public. The extent of overprotection is larger in dictatorial than in democratic countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey, 2007. "Overprotected Politicians," IEW - Working Papers 321, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:321
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    File URL: https://www.econ.uzh.ch/apps/workingpapers/wp/iewwp321.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zaryab Iqbal & Christopher Zorn, 2008. "The Political Consequences of Assassination," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(3), pages 385-400, June.
    2. Bruno S. Frey, 2007. "Why Kill Politicians? A Rational Choice Analysis of Political Assassinations," CREMA Working Paper Series 2007-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6913 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Politicians; rational choice; assassination; security; democracy; dictatorship;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

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