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Pipes, Taps and Vendors: Managing and Regulating the Unconnected Water Market

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  • Meran, Georg
  • Siehlow, Markus
  • von Hirschhausen, Christian

Abstract

Against the background of the human rights to water and the SDG No. 6, vendors play a pivotal role for an IWRM-based water supply system in the future. With the help of a micro-economic model, an optimal modal split is derived, the result of which is that not all households should be served by the pipe-based municipal supply. Instead, the non-connected households should be served by non-mobile or mobile vendors. Furthermore, we analyze different structures in the unconnected market. If vendors compete against each other, the optimal modal split can be replicated. If vendors form a cartel, market interventions, such as a cost related zonal price cap or a subsidizing strategy, are required for preventing the abuse of market power by the vendors.

Suggested Citation

  • Meran, Georg & Siehlow, Markus & von Hirschhausen, Christian, 2018. "Pipes, Taps and Vendors: Managing and Regulating the Unconnected Water Market," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181584, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc18:181584
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Production; Pricing; Market Structure; Economics of Regulation; Water; Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)

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