Drain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism
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- Gabriele Gratton & Barton E. Lee, 2024. "Drain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism," Discussion Papers 2023-02b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2023-03-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2023-03-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2023-03-13 (Positive Political Economics)
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