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A Safe Asset Perspective for an Integrated Policy Framework

Author

Listed:
  • Markus K. Brunnermeier

    (Princeton University)

  • Sebastian Merkel

    (Princeton University)

  • Yuliy Sannikov

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

Borrowing from Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016, 2019) this policy paper sketches a policy framework for emerging market economies by mapping out the roles and interactions of monetary policy, macroprudential policies, foreign exchange interventions, and capital controls. Safe assets are central in a world in which financial frictions, distribution of risk, and risk premia are important elements. The paper also proposes a global safe asset for a more self-stabilizing global financial architecture.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sebastian Merkel & Yuliy Sannikov, 2020. "A Safe Asset Perspective for an Integrated Policy Framework," Working Papers 2020-58, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    • Handle: RePEc:pri:econom:2020-58
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Luis Garicano & Philip R. Lane & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Tano Santos & David Thesmar & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2016. "The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 508-512, May.
    2. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-661, September.
    3. Carmen M. Reinhart & Graciela L. Kaminsky, 1999. "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 473-500, June.
    4. Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2003. "Bubbles and Crashes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 173-204, January.
    5. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Harold James & Jean-Pierre Landau, 2019. "The Digitalization of Money," Working Papers 2019-13, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    6. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "ESBies: safety in the tranches," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(90), pages 175-219.
    7. Joseph Abadi & Markus Brunnermeier & Yann Koby, 2023. "The Reversal Interest Rate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(8), pages 2084-2120, August.
    8. Brunnermeier, Markus & Merkel, Sebastian & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2020. "The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level with a Bubble," CEPR Discussion Papers 14680, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1037-1047, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cheema, Muhammad A. & Faff, Robert & Szulczyk, Kenneth R., 2022. "The 2008 global financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic: How safe are the safe haven assets?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Safe asset; bubbles; international capital flows; capital controls; monetary policy; macroprudential policy; FX interventions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • F38 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls

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