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Odkrywkowa kopalnia węgla brunatnego i elektrownia jako bilateralny monopol w ujęciu klasycznym

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  • Jurdziak, Leszek

Abstract

Opencast lignite mine and power plant as a bilateral monopoly in classical solution Based on example of opencast lignite mine and power plant operating on liberalized energy market the classical solution maximizing joint profits of bilateral monopoly has been presented. The graphic solution of finding the optimal quantity of coal production and contract curve has been presented based on demand, marginal revenue and cost curves. The advantage of vertical integration has been shown as well as alternative possibility of finding optimal solution using formula price contracts with agreed profit division. The need of further adaptation of presented classical bilateral model and its solution has been stressed in order to take into account restrictions imposed by the fact that one side of bilateral monopoly is an opencast mine exploiting unique lignite deposit. Usage of mining optimization programs has been proposed to determine supply of coal and cost curves.

Suggested Citation

  • Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Odkrywkowa kopalnia węgla brunatnego i elektrownia jako bilateralny monopol w ujęciu klasycznym," MPRA Paper 530, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 2006.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:530
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/530/1/MPRA_paper_530.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jurdziak, Leszek & Kawalec, Witold, 2006. "Analiza wrażliwości wielkości i parametrów wyrobiska docelowego kopalni węgla brunatnego na zmianę ceny bazowej węgla," MPRA Paper 529, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 2006.
    2. Blair, Roger D & Kaserman, David L, 1987. "A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula Price Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 460-463, June.
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    1. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej," MPRA Paper 478, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Feb 2000.
    2. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne [Nash bargaining solution and the split of profit in," MPRA Paper 4142, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Jan 2006.
    3. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału [Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of mines and pow," MPRA Paper 2384, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Mar 2007.
    4. Jurdziak, Leszek & Kawalec, Witold, 2006. "Analiza wrażliwości wielkości i parametrów wyrobiska docelowego kopalni węgla brunatnego na zmianę ceny bazowej węgla," MPRA Paper 529, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 2006.
    5. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Wpływ struktury organizacyjno-właścicielskiej na funkcjonowanie bilateralnego monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni," MPRA Paper 533, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Oct 2006.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bilateral monopoly; open pit optimisation; lignite price; contract curve; price negotiation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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