IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gro/rugsom/12004-eef.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Welfare financing

Author

Listed:
  • Toolsema-Veldman, Linda
  • Allers, M.A.

    (Groningen University)

Abstract

Welfare is often administered locally, but financed through grants from the central government. This raises the question how the central government can prevent local governments from spending more than necessary. Block grants are more efficient than matching grants, because the latter reduce the local governments

Suggested Citation

  • Toolsema-Veldman, Linda & Allers, M.A., 2012. "Welfare financing," Research Report 12004-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
  • Handle: RePEc:gro:rugsom:12004-eef
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11370/2e819e13-16f0-458d-a865-b6d40aa4dee7
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bernd Huber & Marco Runkel, 2006. "Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants Under Asymmetric Information," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(1), pages 25-41, January.
    2. Timothy Goodspeed, 2002. "Bailouts in a Federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 409-421, August.
    3. Horst Raff & John Wilson, 1997. "Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 4(4), pages 407-427, November.
    4. Robin W. Boadway & Frank R. Flatters, 1982. "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(4), pages 613-633, November.
    5. Marie-Laure Breuillé & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2007. "Sharing Budgetary Austerity under free Mobility and Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00356048, HAL.
    6. Robin Boadway, 2006. "Intergovernmental Redistributive Transfers: Efficiency and Equity," Chapters, in: Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio (ed.), Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Breuillé, Marie-Laure & Madiès, Thierry & Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle, 2010. "Gross versus net equalization scheme in a federation with decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 205-214, September.
    8. Howard Chernick, 1998. "Fiscal Effects of Block Grants for the Needy: An Interpretation of the Evidence," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(2), pages 205-233, May.
    9. James M. Buchanan, 1952. "Federal Grants and Resource Allocation: A Reply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(6), pages 536-536.
    10. Breuille, Marie-Laure & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2007. "Sharing budgetary austerity under free mobility and asymmetric information: An optimal regulation approach to fiscal federalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 1177-1196, June.
    11. Alan Duncan & Peter Smith, 1995. "Modelling local government budgetary choices under expenditure limitation," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 16(4), pages 95-110, November.
    12. Nobuo Akai & Emilson Silva, 2009. "Interregional redistribution as a cure to the soft budget syndrome in federations," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(1), pages 43-58, February.
    13. Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2002. "Local public goods, inter-regional transfers and private information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 329-356, February.
    14. Buchanan, James M. & Goetz, Charles J., 1972. "Efficiency limits of fiscal mobility: An assessment of the tiebout model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 25-43, April.
    15. Le Grand, Julian, 1975. "Fiscal Equity and Central Government Grants to Local Authorities," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 85(339), pages 531-547, September.
    16. Akai, Nobuo & Sato, Motohiro, 2008. "Too big or too small? A synthetic view of the commitment problem of interregional transfers," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 551-559, November.
    17. James M. Buchanan, 1952. "Federal Grants and Resource Allocation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(3), pages 208-208.
    18. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn.
    19. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 22, pages 384-414, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Rebecca M. Blank, 2002. "Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1105-1166, December.
    21. Riordan, Michael H. & Sappington, David E. M., 1988. "Optimal contracts with public ex post information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 189-199, June.
    22. Roland Strausz, 2006. "Interim Information in Long‐Term Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 1041-1067, December.
    23. David C. Ribar & Mark O. Wilhelm, 1999. "The Demand for Welfare Generosity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(1), pages 96-108, February.
    24. Allers, Maarten A., 2012. "Yardstick competition, fiscal disparities, and equalization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 4-6.
    25. Giancarlo Pola & George France & Rosella Levaggi (ed.), 1996. "Developments in Local Government Finance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 799.
    26. Bird, Richard M. & Smart, Michael, 2002. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: International Lessons for Developing Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 899-912, June.
    27. Bucovetsky, Sam, 1998. "Federalism, equalization and risk aversion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 301-328, March.
    28. Marie-Laure Breuillé & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2007. "Sharing Budgetary Austerity under free Mobility and Asymmetric Information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00356048, HAL.
    29. Katherine Baicker, 2005. "Extensive or Intensive Generosity? The Price and Income Effects of Federal Grants," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 371-384, May.
    30. Bradbury, Katharine & Zhao, Bo, 2009. "Measuring Non–School Fiscal Disparities Among Municipalities," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 62(1), pages 25-56, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:dgr:rugsom:12004-eef is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Linda Toolsema & Maarten Allers, 2014. "Welfare Financing: Grant Allocation and Efficiency," De Economist, Springer, vol. 162(2), pages 147-166, June.
    3. Huber, Bernd & Runkel, Marco, 2008. "Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2350-2361, December.
    4. Anton Bondarev & Beat Hintermann & Frank C. Krysiak & Ralph Winkler, 2017. "The Intricacy of Adapting to Climate Change: Flood Protection as a Local Public Goods Game," CESifo Working Paper Series 6382, CESifo.
    5. Geys, Benny & Konrad, Kai A., . "Federalism and optimal allocation across levels of governance," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    6. Timm Bönke & Beate Jochimsen & Carsten Schröder, 2013. "Fiscal Federalism and Tax Administration: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1307, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Bönke, Timm & Jochimsen, Beate & Schröder, Carsten, 2011. "Fiscal equalization and regions' (un)willingness-to-tax: Evidence from Germany," Economics Working Papers 2011-06, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    8. Bönke, Timm & Jochimsen, Beate & Schröder, Carsten, 2014. "Fiscal federalism and tax enforcement," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100394, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    9. Darong Dai & Guoqiang Tian, 2023. "Optimal interregional redistribution and local budget rules with multidimensional heterogeneity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 79-124, February.
    10. Boadway, Robin & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2012. "Reassessment of the Tiebout model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1063-1078.
    11. Timothy J. Goodspeed, 2017. "Bailouts and Soft Budget Constraints in Decentralized Government: A Synthesis and Survey of an Alternative View of Intergovernmental Grant Policy," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 221(2), pages 113-134, June.
    12. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 2017. "The impressive contribution of Canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1348-1380, December.
    13. Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2013. "Non-cooperative pollution control in an inter-jurisdictional setting," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 783-796.
    14. Stephanie Armbruster & Beat Hintermann, 2020. "Decentralization with porous borders: public production in a federation with tax competition and spillovers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(3), pages 606-642, June.
    15. Nicolas Gravel & Michel Poitevin, 2014. "Should a Non-Rival Public Good Always Be Provided Centrally?," Working Papers halshs-01063191, HAL.
    16. Carmela Brugnano & Giuseppe Ferraina & Andrea Ferri & Larysa Minzyuk & Felice Russo, 2017. "Federalismo municipale e nuovo sistema perequativo: il Fondo di solidariet? comunale 2016," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2017(2), pages 93-133.
    17. Albouy, David, 2012. "Evaluating the efficiency and equity of federal fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 824-839.
    18. Audun Langørgen, 2015. "A structural approach for analyzing fiscal equalization," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(3), pages 376-400, June.
    19. Mario TURCO, 2015. "The Management of the Financial Collapse of Local Bodies and its Economic-Territorial Effects: The Case of the Municipality of Taranto," REVISTA ADMINISTRATIE SI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC, Faculty of Administration and Public Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2015(25), pages 6-26, Decembre.
    20. Timm Bönke & Beate Jochimsen & Carsten Schröder, 2017. "Fiscal Equalization and Tax Enforcement," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 18(3), pages 377-409, August.
    21. Darong Dai & Liqun Liu & Guoqiang Tian, 2019. "Interregional redistribution and budget institutions with private information on intergenerational externality," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 23(3), pages 127-154, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gro:rugsom:12004-eef. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Hanneke Tamling (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ferugnl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.