The Complexity of CEO Compensation
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Cited by:
- Clementi, Gian Luca & Cooley, Thomas F. & Wang, Cheng, 2006.
"Stock grants as a commitment device,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2191-2216, November.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Cheng Wang, "undated". "Stock Grants as Commitment Device," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E12, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Chen Wang, 2004. "Stock Grants as a Committment Device," Working Papers 04-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Clementi, Gian Luca & Cooley, Thomas F. & Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Stock Grants As a Commitment Device," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12300, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Frédéric Teulon & Guillaume Bigot & Bernard Terrany & Negar Youssefian, 2016. "Rémunérations des PDG : toniques ou toxiques ? Une mise en perspective de la littérature," Post-Print hal-01865108, HAL.
- Wang, Cheng, 1997.
"Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 72-105, September.
- Wang, C., 1995. "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," GSIA Working Papers 1995-08, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Wang, Cheng, 1997. "Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5170, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2014-11-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2014-11-01 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2014-11-01 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
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