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A Fictitious Play of the Nash Demand Game Implements the Nash Bargaining Solution

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  • Younghwan In

Abstract

We study a repeated Nash demand game, where bargainers follow a fictitious play procedure after their one-shot decision on demand in the initial period. In the reduced static game they play at the initial period, all the epsilon-equilibria are clustered around the division corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution when the bargainers are patient. As the bargainers make a more accurate comparison of payoffs and become more patient accordingly, the only equilibrium left is the division of the Nash bargaining solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Younghwan In, 2004. "A Fictitious Play of the Nash Demand Game Implements the Nash Bargaining Solution," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 642, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:642
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fictitious play; Nash demand game; epsilon-equilibrium; Nash bargaining solution; Nash program.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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