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An equilibrium search model of the French dual market for medical services

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  • Besancenot, Damien

    (ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School)

  • Vranceanu, Radu

    (ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School)

Abstract

The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.

Suggested Citation

  • Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2017. "An equilibrium search model of the French dual market for medical services," ESSEC Working Papers WP1709, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-17009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mehrez, A. & Yuan, Y. & Gafni, A., 1995. "The search for information -- A patient perspective on multiple opinions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 244-262, September.
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    3. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2004. "Quality and price dispersion in an equilibrium search model," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 99-116.
    4. Stigler, George J., 2011. "Economics of Information," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 5, pages 35-49.
    5. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
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    7. Isabelle Clerc & Olivier L’Haridon & Alain Paraponaris & Camelia Protopopescu & Bruno Ventelou, 2012. "Fee-for-service payments and consultation length in general practice: a work--leisure trade-off model for French GPs," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(25), pages 3323-3337, September.
    8. Rochaix, Lise, 1989. "Information asymmetry and search in the market for physicians' services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 53-84, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Damien Besancenot & Karine Lamiraud & Radu Vranceanu, 2023. "A model for dual health care market with congestion differentiation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 400-423, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equilibrium search; Medical fee dispersion; Dual market; Regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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