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Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions

Author

Listed:
  • Brams, Steven J.
  • Kilgour, D. Marc
  • Zwicker, William

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William, 1997. "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions," Working Papers 97-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:97-15
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2016. "Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 559-587, October.
    2. Haris Aziz & Xinhang Lu & Mashbat Suzuki & Jeremy Vollen & Toby Walsh, 2023. "Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness in Committee Voting," Papers 2303.03642, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    3. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 269-300, November.
    4. Grandi, Umberto & Lang, Jérôme & Ozkes, Ali & Airiau, Stéphane, 2020. "Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda," SocArXiv y4m6r, Center for Open Science.
    5. Daniel Finke & Andreas Fleig, 2013. "The merits of adding complexity: non-separable preferences in spatial models of European Union politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(4), pages 546-575, October.
    6. List, Christian, 2003. "A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-13, February.
    7. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
    8. Jonathan Hodge & Peter Schwallier, 2006. "How Does Separability Affect The Desirability Of Referendum Election Outcomes?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 251-276, November.
    9. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Kornhauser, Lewis A., 2010. "Only a dictatorship is efficient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 261-270, November.
    10. Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2015. "Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory," Working Papers halshs-01168767, HAL.
    11. Tuğçe Çuhadaroğlu & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(4), pages 525-536, April.
    12. Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.
    13. Hannu Nurmi & Tommi Meskanen, 2000. "Voting Paradoxes and MCDM," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 297-313, July.
    14. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01304688 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, 2000. "A Problem with Referendums," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(1), pages 5-31, January.
    16. Lang, Jrme & Xia, Lirong, 2009. "Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 304-324, May.
    17. Bradley, W. James & Hodge, Jonathan K. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2005. "Separable discrete preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 335-353, May.
    18. Mogens K. Justesen, 2007. "The Social Choice of EU Treaties," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(4), pages 537-553, December.
    19. Simon Hug & George Tsebelis, 2002. "Veto Players and Referendums Around the World," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(4), pages 465-515, October.
    20. Francesco Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2018. "A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 493-512, October.
    21. Clark Bowman & Jonathan Hodge & Ada Yu, 2014. "The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 111-124, June.
    22. Simon Hug, 2009. "Some thoughts about referendums, representative democracy, and separation of powers," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 251-266, September.
    23. Hannu Nurmi, 2007. "Assessing Borda's Rule and Its Modifications," Discussion Papers 15, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    24. Daniel Bochsler, 2010. "The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 119-131, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Referenda; spearable preferences; aggregation methods; voting procedures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

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