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Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Leasing Market: Are Buybacks the Solution?

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  • Weisburd, Sarit
  • Bird, Daniel
  • Ben-Porath, Ronny

Abstract

We study the problem faced by a car-leasing firm in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard. While the literature has primarily focused on the role of leasing in avoiding adverse selection and the role of an above market buyback price in this environment, we show how this result reverses when moral hazard concerns are severe. The key driver of this result is that a low buy back price can incentivize non-contractible investment. We test the model using a difference-in-differences technique to compare accident outcomes of individuals driving leased company vehicles in Israel before and after a tax change and differentiate between drivers by their probability of utilizing the buyback clause. Our analysis shows that once exiting the leasing cycle becomes a relevant option due to a 110 percent increase in the tax rate on company cars it decreases the at-fault accident rate by half an accident per year (s.e. 0.25) for relevant drivers.

Suggested Citation

  • Weisburd, Sarit & Bird, Daniel & Ben-Porath, Ronny, 2018. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Leasing Market: Are Buybacks the Solution?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12633, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12633
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Johnson, Justin P & Waldman, Michael, 2003. "Leasing, Lemons, and Buybacks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 247-265, Summer.
    2. Wayne Dunham, 2003. "Moral Hazard and the Market for Used Automobiles," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 23(1), pages 65-83, August.
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    5. Preyas Desai & Devavrat Purohit, 1998. "Leasing and Selling: Optimal Marketing Strategies for a Durable Goods Firm," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(11-Part-2), pages 19-34, November.
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    8. Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2002. "The Role of Leasing under Adverse Selection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 113-143, February.
    9. Henry Schneider, 2010. "Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 783-805.
    10. Justin P. Johnson & Henry S. Schneider & Michael Waldman, 2014. "The Role and Growth of New-Car Leasing: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(3), pages 665-698.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brewer, Dylan, 2022. "Equilibrium sorting and moral hazard in residential energy contracts," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral hazard; Adverse selection; Leasing; Buyback;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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