Career Concerns with Coarse Information
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- Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2011. "Career Concerns with Coarse Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1831, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2012.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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