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The Impact of Policy Interventions on Systemic Risk across Banks

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  • Simona Nistor

    (Babes-Bolyai University - Department of Finance)

  • Steven Ongena

    (University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Swiss Finance Institute; KU Leuven; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR))

Abstract

What is the impact of policy interventions on the systemic risk of banks? To answer this question, we analyze a comprehensive sample that combines bank-specific bailout events with balance sheets of key affected and non-affected European banks between 2008 and 2014. We find that guarantees reduce the systemic risk contribution made by small banks in the short run and by small or less liquid banks in the long run. Recapitalizations immediately decrease banks’ systemic importance, but the effect is also short-lived. Liquidity injections may even significantly increase systemic risk especially when administered to the less capitalized or highly profitable banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Simona Nistor & Steven Ongena, 2020. "The Impact of Policy Interventions on Systemic Risk across Banks," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 20-101, Swiss Finance Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp20101
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    2. Daniele Petrone & Neofytos Rodosthenous & Vito Latora, 2022. "An AI approach for managing financial systemic risk via bank bailouts by taxpayers," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 13(1), pages 1-18, December.
    3. Marion Dupire & Christian Haddad & Regine Slagmulder, 2022. "The Importance of Board Risk Oversight in Times of Crisis," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 61(3), pages 319-365, June.
    4. Fărcaș, Ioana Georgiana & Nistor, Simona, 2023. "The impact of culture on government interventions in the banking sector," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    systemic risk; policy interventions; risk profile; Conditional Value at Risk; G-SIBs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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