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Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty

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  • Braz Camargo
  • Dino Gerardi
  • Lucas Maestri

Abstract

We study efficiency in decentralized markets with aggregate uncertainty and one-sided private information. There is a continuum of mass one of uninformed buyers and a continuum of mass one of informed sellers. Buyers and sellers are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs over time, and buyers make the offers. We show that all equilibria become efficient as trading frictions vanish.

Suggested Citation

  • Braz Camargo & Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri, 2016. "Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 453, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  • Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:453
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Serrano, Roberto, 2002. "Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: a pairwise meetings market with private values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 65-89, September.
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    4. Mark Satterthwaite & Artyom Shneyerov, 2007. "Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 155-200, January.
    5. Gianni De Fraja & Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Walras Retrouve: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 842-863, August.
    6. Mikhail Golosov & Guido Lorenzoni & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2014. "Decentralized Trading With Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1055-1091, May.
    7. Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2016. "Search With Adverse Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 243-315, January.
    8. Wolinsky, Asher, 1990. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 1-23, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Asriyan, Vladimir & Fuchs, William & Green, Brett, 2021. "Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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