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Andrew Mackenzie

Personal Details

First Name:Andrew
Middle Name:
Last Name:Mackenzie
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pma1526
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/andrewkmackenzie/home

Affiliation

School of Business and Economics
Maastricht University

Maastricht, Netherlands
http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/sbe
RePEc:edi:femaanl (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Florian Brandl & Andrew Mackenzie, 2023. "Patience ensures fairness," Papers 2311.06092, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
  2. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2022. "Tract Housing, The Core, And Pendulum Auctions," Discussion papers e-22-005, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
  3. Andrew Mackenzie & Christian Trudeau, 2021. "On Groves Mechanisms for Costly Inclusion," Working Papers 1901, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
  4. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2020. "Menu Mechanisms," Discussion papers e-19-012, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
  5. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2018. "A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  6. Mackenzie, Andrew & Trudeau, Christian, 2018. "Club good mechanisms: from free-riders to citizen-shareholders, from impossibility to characterization," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

Articles

  1. Mackenzie, Andrew & Trudeau, Christian, 2023. "On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
  2. Mackenzie, Andrew & Komornik, Vilmos, 2023. "Fairly taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 743-764.
  3. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  4. Andrew Mackenzie, 2021. "On atom-swarming and Luce’s theorem for probabilistic beliefs," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 67-74, April.
  5. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
  6. Andrew Mackenzie, 2020. "An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 713-743, April.
  7. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2019. "A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
  8. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2015. "Symmetry and impartial lotteries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 15-28.
  9. Cervone, Davide P. & Dai, Ronghua & Gnoutcheff, Daniel & Lanterman, Grant & Mackenzie, Andrew & Morse, Ari & Srivastava, Nikhil & Zwicker, William S., 2012. "Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 11-27.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2022. "Tract Housing, The Core, And Pendulum Auctions," Discussion papers e-22-005, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

    Cited by:

    1. Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2023. "Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 210-228.

  2. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2020. "Menu Mechanisms," Discussion papers e-19-012, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

    Cited by:

    1. Emiliano Catonini & Jingyi Xue, 2020. "Local Dominance," Papers 2012.14432, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    2. Gian Caspari & Manshu Khanna, 2021. "Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets," Papers 2111.06815, arXiv.org.

  3. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2018. "A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

    Cited by:

    1. Bonanno, Giacomo & Tsakas, Elias, 2018. "Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 231-241.
    2. Giulio Principi & Peter P. Wakker & Ruodu Wang, 2023. "Antimonotonicity for Preference Axioms: The Natural Counterpart to Comonotonicity," Papers 2307.08542, arXiv.org.
    3. Ha-Huy, Thai, 2019. "Savage's theorem with atoms," MPRA Paper 94516, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Baillon, Aurélien & Bleichrodt, Han & Li, Chen & Wakker, Peter P., 2021. "Belief hedges: Measuring ambiguity for all events and all models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    5. Mackenzie, Andrew & Komornik, Vilmos, 2023. "Fairly taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 743-764.
    6. Stanca, Lorenzo, 2020. "A simplified approach to subjective expected utility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 151-160.
    7. Andrew Mackenzie, 2021. "On atom-swarming and Luce’s theorem for probabilistic beliefs," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 67-74, April.
    8. Giacomo Bonanno & Elias Tsakas, 2017. "Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games," Working Papers 181, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    9. Abdellaoui, Mohammed & Wakker, Peter P., 2020. "Savage for dummies and experts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).

  4. Mackenzie, Andrew & Trudeau, Christian, 2018. "Club good mechanisms: from free-riders to citizen-shareholders, from impossibility to characterization," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

    Cited by:

    1. Sophie Bade & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2018. "Fairness for Multi-Self Agents," Papers 1811.06684, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.

Articles

  1. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.

    Cited by:

    1. Pablo R. Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2023. "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition," Working Papers 293, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    2. Andrew Komo & Scott Duke Kominers & Tim Roughgarden, 2024. "Shill-Proof Auctions," Papers 2404.00475, arXiv.org.
    3. Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 181-196.
    4. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2020. "Menu Mechanisms," Discussion papers e-19-012, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    5. Louis Golowich & Shengwu Li, 2021. "On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," Papers 2101.05149, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    6. Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2022. "On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    7. Shengwu Li, 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers 2403.18694, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    8. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
    9. Siyang Xiong, 2024. "Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle," Papers 2402.13580, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    10. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2019. "All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 966.19, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    11. Pycia, Marek & Troyan, Peter, 2022. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 14043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Soo Hong Chew & Wenqian Wang, 2022. "Information Design of Dynamic Mechanisms," Papers 2205.10844, arXiv.org.
    13. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2022. "Tract Housing, The Core, And Pendulum Auctions," Discussion papers e-22-005, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    14. Mariya Halushka, 2021. "Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information," Working Papers 2104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    15. Clayton Thomas, 2020. "Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof," Papers 2011.12367, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.

  3. Andrew Mackenzie, 2020. "An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 713-743, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Javier Cembrano & Felix Fischer & Max Klimm, 2023. "Optimal Impartial Correspondences," Papers 2301.04544, arXiv.org.
    2. In'acio B'o & Li Chen, 2021. "Designing Heaven's Will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service," Papers 2105.02457, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
    3. Burak Can & Péter Csóka & Emre Ergin, 2021. "How to choose a fair delegation?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1339-1373, November.
    4. Amorós, Pablo, 2022. "Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    5. Cho, Wonki Jo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2024. "On reaching social consent," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    6. Amorós, Pablo, 2021. "Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    7. Javier Cembrano & Svenja M. Griesbach & Maximilian J. Stahlberg, 2023. "Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights," Papers 2310.14991, arXiv.org.
    8. Mathieu Martin & Zéphirin Nganmeni & Ashley Piggins & Élise F. Tchouante, 2022. "Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 301-316, March.
    9. Matthew Olckers & Toby Walsh, 2022. "Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A Survey," Papers 2210.01984, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.

  4. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2019. "A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2015. "Symmetry and impartial lotteries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 15-28.

    Cited by:

    1. Javier Cembrano & Felix Fischer & Max Klimm, 2023. "Optimal Impartial Correspondences," Papers 2301.04544, arXiv.org.
    2. Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser, 2023. "Simple Allocation with Correlated Types," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_486, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    3. Pablo Amorós, 2020. "Aggregating experts’ opinions to select the winner of a competition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 833-849, September.
    4. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2023. "Selecting a winner with external referees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    5. Amorós, Pablo, 2022. "Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    6. Andrew Mackenzie, 2020. "An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 713-743, April.
    7. Amorós, Pablo, 2020. "Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    8. Amorós, Pablo, 2021. "Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    9. Edelman, Paul H. & Por, Attila, 2021. "A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 443-451.
    10. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2018. "A Game of the Throne of Saint Peter," Research Memorandum 015, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    11. Ruben Juarez & Kohei Nitta & Miguel Vargas, 2020. "Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 817-846, October.
    12. Javier Cembrano & Felix Fischer & Max Klimm, 2023. "Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection," Papers 2305.09998, arXiv.org.
    13. Matthew Olckers & Toby Walsh, 2022. "Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A Survey," Papers 2210.01984, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.

  6. Cervone, Davide P. & Dai, Ronghua & Gnoutcheff, Daniel & Lanterman, Grant & Mackenzie, Andrew & Morse, Ari & Srivastava, Nikhil & Zwicker, William S., 2012. "Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 11-27.

    Cited by:

    1. Hun Chung & John Duggan, 2018. "Directional equilibria," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(3), pages 272-305, July.
    2. Huremović, Kenan & Ozkes, Ali I., 2022. "Polarization in networks: Identification–alienation framework," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    3. Richard Lee Brady & Christopher P. Chambers, 2017. "A spatial analogue of May’s Theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 657-669, December.
    4. Houy, Nicolas & Zwicker, William S., 2014. "The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 7-16.
    5. Jim Henle, 2022. "The Pleasures of Friends," The Mathematical Intelligencer, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 277-284, September.
    6. Brady, Richard L. & Chambers, Christopher P., 2015. "Spatial implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 200-205.
    7. Benjamin Hadjibeyli & Mark C. Wilson, 2019. "Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 559-583, March.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (4) 2018-05-21 2019-01-14 2020-03-30 2022-11-14
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2018-05-21 2018-05-21 2019-01-14 2020-03-30
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2018-05-21 2019-01-14 2022-11-14
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2020-03-30
  5. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (1) 2023-12-18

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