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Congress and Administrative Policymaking: Identifying Congressional Veto Power

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  • Alex Acs

Abstract

The ability of presidents to unilaterally shape administrative policymaking challenges a foundation of congressional power: Rarely can Congress statutorily veto administrative actions over presidential opposition. Consequently, Congress has turned to other means of influence, including the appropriations and oversight processes, although questions remain about the degree to which they have been effective. To investigate, I study a spatial model of administrative policymaking that assumes Congress can execute a legislative veto, as well as a baseline model in which congressional influence requires a coalition with the president. I compare the two models and develop empirical tests that exploit instances when their implications differ. Applying the tests to data on federal regulatory policymaking shows consistent evidence that Congress exerts veto power over administrative activity, even over those actions endorsed by the president. I conclude by discussing some broader implications, including the extent to which existing studies understate the constraints on presidential power.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Acs, 2019. "Congress and Administrative Policymaking: Identifying Congressional Veto Power," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 513-529, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:63:y:2019:i:3:p:513-529
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12444
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    1. Coglianese, Cary, 2006. "Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future," Working Paper Series rwp06-027, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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