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Optimal dynamic matching

Author

Listed:
  • Baccara, Mariagiovanna

    (Olin School of Business, Washington University in St Louis)

  • Lee, SangMok

    (Department of Economics, Washington Univ. in St. Louis)

  • Yariv, Leeat

    (Department of Economics, Princeton University)

Abstract

We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeoff between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher-quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In discretionary settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium, but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify the welfare gain from centralization, which can be substantial, even for low waiting costs. We also evaluate welfare improvements generated by alternative priority protocols.

Suggested Citation

  • Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2020. "Optimal dynamic matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:3740
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2020. "Optimal dynamic matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    2. Platz, Trine Tornøe & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "The curse of the first-in–first-out queue discipline," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 165-176.
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    11. Curtis R. Taylor, 1995. "The Long Side of the Market and the Short End of the Stick: Bargaining Power and Price Formation in Buyers', Sellers', and Balanced Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 837-855.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marco LiCalzi, 2022. "Bipartite choices," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 45(2), pages 551-568, December.
    2. Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2023. "When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1145-1173, November.
    3. Schummer, James, 2021. "Influencing waiting lists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    4. Jose H. Blanchet & Martin I. Reiman & Viragh Shah & Lawrence M. Wein & Linjia Wu, 2020. "Asymptotically Optimal Control of a Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities," Papers 2002.03205, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.
    5. Ce Liu, 2020. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Papers 2007.03794, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    6. Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & Vahideh Manshadi, 2023. "Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(7), pages 3778-3796, July.
    7. Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5455-5478, September.
    8. Nick Arnosti & Peng Shi, 2020. "Design of Lotteries and Wait-Lists for Affordable Housing Allocation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(6), pages 2291-2307, June.
    9. Doval, Laura, 2022. "Dynamically stable matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    10. Vincent Iehlé, 2016. "Gradual College Admisssion," Post-Print halshs-02367006, HAL.
    11. Maxey, Tyler, 2023. "Dynamic matching with transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    12. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2023. "Task allocation and on-the-job training," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    13. Niclas Boehmer & Markus Brill & Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, 2021. "Selecting Matchings via Multiwinner Voting: How Structure Defeats a Large Candidate Space," Papers 2102.07441, arXiv.org.
    14. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2020. "Optimal dynamic matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    15. Ramesh Johari & Vijay Kamble & Yash Kanoria, 2021. "Matching While Learning," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 655-681, March.
    16. Irene Lo & Vahideh Manshadi & Scott Rodilitz & Ali Shameli, 2020. "Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement," Papers 2005.10731, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    17. Lei, Xiaochang, 2023. "Optimal queue to minimize waste," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 87-94.
    18. Mohammad Akbarpour & Yeganeh Alimohammadi & Shengwu Li & Amin Saberi, 2021. "The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets," Papers 2104.03219, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic matching; mechanism design; organ donation; market design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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