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Co-planning and co-design as progress in the implementation of welfare services

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Becchetti

    (Università di Roma Tor Vergata)

  • Fabio Pisani

    (Universitas Mercatorum)

  • Luca Raffaele

    (CESVA)

Abstract

Co-planning (and co-design) of welfare services between public administrations and civic organisations is an innovative approach aiming to enact and maximise aggregate effort and competence contributions among complementary actors in the direction of participation and active citizenship. In our paper, we develop a simple theoretical framework trying to illustrate how it is possible to pursue the first best of an optimal participated planning, design and management approach for welfare services. We examine pros and cons of different solutions reconciling involvement of civil actors and respect of antitrust principles outlining four benchmark models with different characteristics in terms of upstream and downstream participation levels. We outline policy proposals to solve dilemmas related to the difficulty of jointly activating participation, intrinsic and monetary incentives avoiding in the meanwhile collusion and corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Becchetti & Fabio Pisani & Luca Raffaele, 2023. "Co-planning and co-design as progress in the implementation of welfare services," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 70(3), pages 301-322, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:70:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s12232-023-00420-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-023-00420-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leonardo Becchetti & Giuseppina Gianfreda & Noemi Pace, 2012. "Human resource management and productivity in the “trust game corporation”," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(1), pages 3-20, March.
    2. Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
    3. Yves Vaillancourt, 2009. "Social Economy In The Co‐Construction Of Public Policy," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(2), pages 275-313, June.
    4. G. Daniel & M. Arce & Todd Sandler, 2005. "The Dilemma of the Prisoners’ Dilemmas," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 3-24, February.
    5. Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October.
    6. Leonardo Becchetti & Francesco Salustri, 2019. "The Vote with the Wallet Game: Responsible Consumerism as a Multiplayer Prisoner’s Dilemma," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-22, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Co-planning; Co-design; Welfare services;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General

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