The optimal jury size when jury deliberation follows a random walk
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9222-5
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016.
"Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
- Bryan McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous Competence and a Limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Working Papers 16-12, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
- Guha, Brishti, 2018.
"Secret ballots and costly information gathering: The jury size problem revisited,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 58-67.
- Guha, Brishti, 2016. "Secret ballots and costly information gathering: the jury size problem revisited," MPRA Paper 73048, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Guha, Brishti, 2017. "Should Jurors Deliberate?," MPRA Paper 79876, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Jury deliberation; Jury size; K4; D7;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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