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Regulatory Appraisal: A Neglected Opportunity for Law and Economics

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  • Anthony Ogus

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  • Anthony Ogus, 1998. "Regulatory Appraisal: A Neglected Opportunity for Law and Economics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 53-68, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:6:y:1998:i:1:p:53-68
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008651508123
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shavell, Steven, 1988. "Legal Advice about Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 123-150, January.
    2. Ronald H. Coase, 2000. "The new institutional economics," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
    4. Fenn, P & Veljanovski, C G, 1988. "A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 1055-1070, December.
    5. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-287, April.
    6. Hahn, Robert W. (ed.), 1996. "Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195211740.
    7. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 257-286, January.
    8. Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, 1992. "Informational Approaches to Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026213277x, December.
    9. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
    10. Sugden, Robert & Williams, Alan, 1978. "The Principles of Practical Cost-Benefit Analysis," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198770411.
    11. Viscusi, W Kip, 1984. "The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-Resistant Packaging on Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 324-327, May.
    12. Claude S. Colantoni & Otto A. Davis & Malati Swaminuthan, 1976. "Imperfect Consumers and Welfare Comparisons of Policies Concerning Information and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 602-615, Autumn.
    13. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
    14. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1991. "Regulation and the Law of Torts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 54-58, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hofmann, Ekkehard & von Wangenheim, Georg, 2002. "Trade secrets versus Cost Benefit Analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 511-526, December.

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