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Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy

Author

Listed:
  • Matt Malis

    (Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA)

  • Alastair Smith

    (Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10012, USA)

Abstract

Political leaders value public demonstrations of support from foreign leaders and frequently make concessions in order to obtain them. We model the bargaining dynamics surrounding these exchanges and their impact on the recipient leader’s political survival, with a focus on top-level diplomatic visits as a means of signaling international support. Our model addresses two interrelated questions; first, we consider how symbolic displays of support from one leader to another can be informative even when they are “purchased” with concessions, and second, we derive the equilibrium price and political impact of a visit under different bargaining protocols. The incentive to make a concession in exchange for a visit generally undermines a visit’s signaling value. We identify a diplomatic resource curse, where the existence of opportunities for diplomatic exchange can force leaders into accepting visit-for-concession deals that leave them worse off than if they were diplomatically isolated. Visits never occur when negotiations are fully transparent. Mutually beneficial quid pro quo diplomacy requires opacity in negotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • Matt Malis & Alastair Smith, 2024. "Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-23, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:15:y:2024:i:2:p:14-:d:1377292
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Stasavage, David, 2004. "Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(4), pages 667-703, October.
    3. Vreeland,James Raymond & Dreher,Axel, 2014. "The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521740067.
    4. Goldsmith, Benjamin E. & Horiuchi, Yusaku & Matush, Kelly, 2021. "Does Public Diplomacy Sway Foreign Public Opinion? Identifying the Effect of High-Level Visits," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1342-1357, November.
    5. Myrick, Rachel & Weinstein, Jeremy M., 2022. "Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(2), pages 379-413, February.
    6. Alt, James E. & Calvert, Randall L. & Humes, Brian D., 1988. "Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 445-466, June.
    7. Matush, Kelly, 2023. "Harnessing Backlash: How Leaders Can Benefit from Antagonizing Foreign Actors," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 902-918, July.
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