IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fednci/y2013imaynv.19no.3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Securities loans collateralized by cash: reinvestment risk, run risk, and incentive issues

Author

Listed:
  • Frank M. Keane

Abstract

Securities loans collateralized by cash are by far the most popular form of securities-lending transaction. But when the cash collateral associated with these transactions is actively reinvested by a lender?s agent, potential risks emerge. This study argues that the standard compensation scheme for securities-lending agents, which typically provides for agents to share in gains but not losses, creates incentives for them to take excessive risk. It also highlights the need for greater scrutiny and understanding of cash reinvestment practices?especially in light of the AIG experience, which showed that risks related to cash reinvestment, by even a single participant, could have destabilizing effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank M. Keane, 2013. "Securities loans collateralized by cash: reinvestment risk, run risk, and incentive issues," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 19(May).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednci:y:2013:i:may:n:v.19no.3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci19-3.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci19-3.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tobias Adrian & Brian Begalle & Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin, 2013. "Repo and Securities Lending," NBER Chapters, in: Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling, pages 131-148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Viktoria Baklanova & Adam Copeland & Rebecca McCaughrin, 2015. "Reference Guide to U.S. Repo and Securities Lending Markets," Working Papers 15-17, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    2. Nathan Foley-Fisher & Borghan Narajabad & Stephane Verani, 2016. "Securities Lending as Wholesale Funding: Evidence from the U.S. Life Insurance Industry," NBER Working Papers 22774, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Nathan Foley-Fisher & Stefan Gissler & Stephane Verani, 2019. "Over-the-Counter Market Liquidity and Securities Lending," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 272-294, July.
    4. Zoltan Pozsar, 2014. "Shadow Banking: The Money View," Working Papers 14-04, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    5. Viktoria Baklanova & Cecilia Caglio & Marco Cipriani & Adam Copeland, 2019. "The Use of Collateral in Bilateral Repurchase and Securities Lending Agreements," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 228-249, July.
    6. Joachim Keller & Antoine Bouveret & Cristina Picillo & Zijun Liu & Julien Mazzacurati & Philippe Molitor & Jonas Söderberg & John Theal & Francesco de Rossi & Romain Calleja, 2014. "Securities financing transactions and the (re)use of collateral in Europe – An analysis of the first data collection conducted by the ESRB from a sample of European banks and agent lenders," ESRB Occasional Paper Series 06, European Systemic Risk Board.
    7. Keller, Joachim & Bouveret, Antoine & Picillo, Cristina & Liu, Zijun & Mazzacurati, Julien & Molitor, Philippe & Söderberg, Jonas & Theal, John & de Rossi, Francesco & Calleja, Romain, 2014. "Securities financing transactions and the (re)use of collateral in Europe – An analysis of the first data collection conducted by the ESRB from a sample of European banks and agent lenders," ESRB Occasional Paper Series 6, European Systemic Risk Board.
    8. Ahn, Jungkyu & Ahn, Yongkil, 2023. "Clogged pipes in the repo market," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Office of Financial Research (ed.), 2012. "Office of Financial Research 2012 Annual Report," Reports, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury, number 12-1.
    2. Nathan Foley-Fisher & Borghan Narajabad & Stephane Verani, 2016. "Securities Lending as Wholesale Funding: Evidence from the U.S. Life Insurance Industry," NBER Working Papers 22774, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Thiemann, Matthias & Birk, Marius, 2015. "The regulation of repo markets: Incorporating public interest through a stronger role of civil society," SAFE White Paper Series 25, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    4. Nicola Cetorelli, 2014. "Hybrid intermediaries," Staff Reports 705, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    5. Office of Financial Research (ed.), 2013. "Asset Management and Financial Stability," Reports, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury, number 13-1.
    6. Ronald W.Anderson & Karin Jõeveer, 2014. "The Economics of Collateral," FMG Discussion Papers dp732, Financial Markets Group.
    7. Viktoria Baklanova & Adam Copeland & Rebecca McCaughrin, 2015. "Reference guide to U.S. repo and securities lending markets," Staff Reports 740, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    8. Corradin, Stefano & Eisenschmidt, Jens & Hoerova, Marie & Linzert, Tobias & Schepens, Glenn & Sigaux, Jean-David, 2020. "Money markets, central bank balance sheet and regulation," Working Paper Series 2483, European Central Bank.
    9. Christian Julliard & Gabor Pinter & Karamfil Todorov & Kathy Yuan, 2022. "What drives repo haircuts? Evidence from the UK market," BIS Working Papers 1027, Bank for International Settlements.
    10. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, 2012. "Shadow Banking Regulation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 99-140, October.
    11. Andrzej Slawinski, 2015. "Shielding money creation from severe banking crises: How useful are proposals offered by the alternative reform plans?," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 46(3), pages 191-206.
    12. Gaetano Antinolfi & Francesca Carapella & Charles Kahn & Antoine Martin & David Mills & Ed Nosal, 2015. "Repos, Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(1), pages 21-31, January.
    13. Fukunaga, Ichiro & Kato, Naoya, 2016. "Japanese repo and call markets before, during, and emerging from the financial crisis," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 17-34.
    14. Infante, Sebastian, 2019. "Liquidity windfalls: The consequences of repo rehypothecation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 42-63.
    15. William Arrata & Benoit Nguyen & Imene Rahmouni-Rousseau & Miklos Vari, 2018. "The Scarcity Effect of Quantitative Easing on Repo Rates: Evidence from the Euro Area," IMF Working Papers 2018/258, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, 2012. "shadow banking: a review of the literature," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,, Palgrave Macmillan.
    17. repec:ecb:ecbdps:202011 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Sebastian Infante, 2015. "Liquidity Windfalls: The Consequences of Repo Rehypothecation," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-22, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    19. David Aikman & Jonathan Bridges & Anil Kashyap & Caspar Siegert, 2019. "Would Macroprudential Regulation Have Prevented the Last Crisis?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 107-130, Winter.
    20. Loriano Mancini & Angelo Ranaldo & Jan Wrampelmeyer, 2016. "The Euro Interbank Repo Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(7), pages 1747-1779.
    21. Corradin, Stefano & Maddaloni, Angela, 2020. "The importance of being special: Repo markets during the crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 392-429.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fednci:y:2013:i:may:n:v.19no.3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Gabriella Bucciarelli (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbnyus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.