IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedcer/y1999iqiiip10-20.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Depositor-preference laws and the cost of debt capital

Author

Listed:
  • William P. Osterberg
  • James B. Thomson

Abstract

Under depositor-preference laws, depositors' claims on the assets of failed depository institutions are senior to unsecured general-creditor claims. As a result, depositor preference changes the capital structure of banks and thrifts, thereby affecting the cost of capital for depositories. Depositor preference has no impact on the total value of banks and thrifts, however, unless deposit insurance is mispriced.

Suggested Citation

  • William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1999. "Depositor-preference laws and the cost of debt capital," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 10-20.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcer:y:1999:i:qiii:p:10-20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/review/1999/99-q3-osterberg.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?toc_id=91822&filepath=/docs/publications/frbclevreview/rev_frbclev_1999q3.pdf&start_page=12#scribd-open
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William P. Osterberg, 1996. "The impact of depositor preference laws," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 2-11.
    2. Ramon P. DeGennaro & James B. Thomson, 1992. "Capital forbearance and thrifts: an ex post examination of regulatory gambling," Working Papers (Old Series) 9209, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    3. Chen, Andrew H, 1978. "Recent Developments in the Cost of Debt Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 33(3), pages 863-877, June.
    4. Buser, Stephen A & Chen, Andrew H & Kane, Edward J, 1981. "Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(1), pages 51-60, March.
    5. Edward J. Kane, 1985. "The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262611856, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kahn, Charles M. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2005. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2107-2136, November.
    2. Kevin Davis, 2020. "Regulatory changes to bank liability structures: implications for deposit insurance design," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(1), pages 95-106, March.
    3. Pagès, H. & Santos, J., 2002. "Optimal Supervisory Policies and Depositor-Preferences Laws," Working papers 91, Banque de France.
    4. Chuang‐Chang Chang & San‐Lin Chung & Ruey‐Jenn Ho & Yu‐Jen Hsiao, 2022. "Revisiting the valuation of deposit insurance," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 77-103, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1994. "Depositor preference and the cost of capital for insured depository institutions," Working Papers (Old Series) 9404, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    2. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1997. "Depositor preference legislation and failed banks' resolution costs," Working Papers (Old Series) 9715, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    3. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1990. "The effect of subordinated debt and surety bonds on banks' cost of capital and on the value of federal deposit insurance," Working Papers (Old Series) 9012, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    4. Kane, Edward J., 1995. "Three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 431-459, June.
    5. Ramon P. DeGennaro & Larry H. Lang & James B. Thomson, 1991. "Troubled savings and loan institutions: voluntary restructuring under insolvency," Working Papers (Old Series) 9112, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    6. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1992. "Forbearance, subordinated debt, and the cost of capital for insured depository institutions," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 28(Q III), pages 16-26.
    7. Laeven, Luc & Levine, Ross, 2009. "Bank governance, regulation and risk taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 259-275, August.
    8. Stolz, Stéphanie, 2002. "The Relationship between Bank Capital, Risk-Taking, and Capital Regulation: A Review of the Literature," Kiel Working Papers 1105, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    9. Kane, Edward J & Unal, Haluk, 1990. "Modeling Structural and Temporal Variation in the Market's Valuation of Banking Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 113-136, March.
    10. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1994. "Underlying determinants of closed-bank resolution costs," Working Papers (Old Series) 9403, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    11. Elijah Brewer & Thomas H. Mondschean, 1992. "Ex ante risk and ex post collapse of S&Ls in the 1980s," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 16(Jul), pages 2-12.
    12. De Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000. "Systemic risk: A survey," Working Paper Series 35, European Central Bank.
    13. Yu, Min-Teh, 1996. "Measuring fair capital adequacy holdings for banks: The case of Taiwan," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 239-252.
    14. Kim, Kenneth A. & Lee, Sang-Hyop & Rhee, S. Ghon, 2007. "Large shareholder monitoring and regulation: The Japanese banking experience," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(5), pages 466-486.
    15. James B. Thomson, 2010. "Cleaning up the refuse from a financial crisis: the case for a resolution management corporation," Working Papers (Old Series) 1015, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    16. Edward J. Kane & Min-Teh Yu, 1994. "How Much Did Capital Forbearance Add to the Cost of the S&L Insurance Mess," NBER Working Papers 4701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Anlong Li & Peter H. Ritchken & L. Sankarasubramanian & James B. Thomson, 1993. "Regulatory taxes, investment, and financing decision for insured banks," Working Papers (Old Series) 9303, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    18. John S. Jordan, 1997. "Manager's opportunistic trading of their firms' shares: a case study of executives in the banking industry," Working Papers 97-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    19. Elijah Brewer & William C. Hunter & William E. Jackson, 2004. "Investment opportunity set, product mix, and the relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2004-36, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    20. Asli Demirgüč-Kunt, 1991. "On the valuation of deposit institutions," Working Papers (Old Series) 9104, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedcer:y:1999:i:qiii:p:10-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: 4D Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbclus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.