IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedcec/87535.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Brief History of Bank Capital Requirements in the United States

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph G. Haubrich

Abstract

Modern capital requirements can appear to be overly complex, but they reflect centuries of practical experience, compromises between different regulators, and legal and financial systems that developed over time. This Commentary provides a historical perspective on current discussions of capital requirements by looking at how the understanding of bank capital and the regulations regarding its use have changed over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph G. Haubrich, 2020. "A Brief History of Bank Capital Requirements in the United States," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 2020(05), pages 1-6, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcec:87535
    DOI: 10.26509/frbc-ec-202005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-ec-202005
    File Function: Full Text
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.26509/frbc-ec-202005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roger B. Myerson, 2014. "Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: A Review of Admati and Hellwig's The Bankers' New Clothes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(1), pages 197-210, March.
    2. Richard S. Grossman, 2010. "Unsettled Account: The Evolution of Banking in the Industrialized World since 1800," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9219.
    3. Esty, Benjamin C., 1998. "The impact of contingent liability on commercial bank risk taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 189-218, February.
    4. Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, 2008. "Taxing Ourselves, 4th Edition: A Citizen's Guide to the Debate over Taxes," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262693631, December.
    5. Randal K. Quarles, 2019. "Refining the Stress Capital Buffer : a speech at [a] Program on International Financial Systems Conference, Frankfurt, Germany, September 5, 2019," Speech 1084, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Tarullo, Daniel, 2008. "Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4235.
    7. John R. Walter, 2019. "US Bank Capital Regulation: History and Changes Since the Financial Crisis," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 1Q, pages 1-40.
    8. Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, 2013. "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9929.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Radoslav Raykov & Consuelo Silva-Buston, 2022. "Asymmetric Systemic Risk," Staff Working Papers 22-19, Bank of Canada.
    2. Ma, Chang & Nguyen, Xuan-Hai, 2021. "Too big to fail and optimal regulation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 747-758.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Joseph G. Haubrich, 2020. "How Cyclical Is Bank Capital?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 27-38, August.
    2. Òscar Jordà & Björn Richter & Moritz Schularick & Alan M Taylor, 2021. "Bank Capital Redux: Solvency, Liquidity, and Crisis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(1), pages 260-286.
    3. Mariathasan, Mike & Merrouche, Ouarda, 2014. "The manipulation of basel risk-weights," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 300-321.
    4. Jenter, Dirk & Aldunate, Felipe & Korteweg, Arthur & Koudijs, Peter, 2021. "Shareholder Liability and Bank Failure," CEPR Discussion Papers 16309, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Mérő, Katalin, 2018. "A kockázatalapú bankszabályozás előretörése és visszaszorulása - az ösztönzési struktúrák szerepe [The emergence and decline of risk-based bank regulation the role of incentive structures]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 981-1005.
    6. Michael D. Bordo, 2017. "An Historical Perspective on the Quest for Financial Stability and the Monetary Policy Regime," NBER Working Papers 24154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Ms. Deniz O Igan & Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond," IMF Working Papers 2019/171, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Stefano Pagliari & Meredith Wilf, 2021. "Regulatory novelty after financial crises: Evidence from international banking and securities standards, 1975–2016," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 933-951, July.
    9. Tryggvi Gudmundsson, 2016. "Whose Credit Line is it Anyway: An Update on Banks' Implicit Subsidies," IMF Working Papers 2016/224, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Barucci, Emilio & Milani, Carlo, 2018. "Do European banks manipulate risk weights?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 47-57.
    11. Richard S. Grossman & Masami Imai, 2011. "Contingent Capital and Bank Risk-Taking among British Banks before World War I," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2011-003, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
    12. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2018. "Government Debt And Banking Fragility: The Spreading Of Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1905-1925, November.
    13. Kris James Mitchener & Matthew Jaremski, 2014. "The Evolution of Bank Supervision: Evidence from U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 20603, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Fidrmuc, Jarko & Lind, Ronja, 2020. "Macroeconomic impact of Basel III: Evidence from a meta-analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    15. Gropp, Reint E. & Köhler, Matthias, 2010. "Bank owners or bank managers: who is keen on risk? Evidence from the financial crisis," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-013, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    16. Ambrocio, Gene & Hasan, Iftekhar & Jokivuolle, Esa & Ristolainen, Kim, 2020. "Are bank capital requirements optimally set? Evidence from researchers’ views," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    17. Denise Hazlett, 2016. "A classroom experiment with bank equity, deposit insurance, and bailouts," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(4), pages 317-323, October.
    18. Christopher Gandrud & Mark Hallerberg, 2015. "Does Banking Union Worsen the EU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 769-785, July.
    19. Caner Bakir, 2017. "How can interactions among interdependent structures, institutions, and agents inform financial stability? What we have still to learn from global financial crisis," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 50(2), pages 217-239, June.
    20. Laeven, Luc & Levine, Ross, 2009. "Bank governance, regulation and risk taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 259-275, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedcec:87535. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: 4D Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbclus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.