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Il nuovo sistema di finanziamento e perequazione per le funzioni non essenziali delle regioni italiane: una simulazione degli effetti redistributivi

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  • Alberto Baffa

Abstract

Il presente articolo riguarda la simulazione degli effetti del nuovo sistema di finanziamento e di perequazione per le funzioni non essenziali delle regioni, previsto dalla normativa in materia di federalismo fiscale, che dovrebbe entrare in vigore dall?anno 2021. L?analisi mostra come la sostituzione dei trasferimenti statali alle regioni con l?attribuzione di gettito tributario costituisca un aspetto determinante per gli effetti finanziari della riforma in termini di guadagni e perdite per ciascuna regione. Inoltre si evince come il modello perequativo delle capacit? fiscali possieda un potenziale redistributivo contenuto, soprattutto se rapportato al complesso delle entrate destinate alle funzioni non essenziali.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Baffa, 2019. "Il nuovo sistema di finanziamento e perequazione per le funzioni non essenziali delle regioni italiane: una simulazione degli effetti redistributivi," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2019(3), pages 7-40.
  • Handle: RePEc:fan:epepep:v:html10.3280/ep2019-003001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Perequazione; capacit? fiscali; federalismo fiscale; regioni;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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