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Productivity within groups: An analysis of shirking in high school cross country competitions

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  • Ashby, Nathan J.
  • Ramos, Miguel A.

Abstract

Using enrollment-based classification realignments for high school cross country running competitions in the state of Texas, we analyze the impact of changes in the intensity of competition on team performance. The analysis demonstrates significant reductions in shirking for teams promoted to more competitive classifications in the boys’ division but does not yield similar results in the girls’ division. We also analyze the impact on runners according to their rankings within teams and find less shirking by runners ranking lower relative to team leaders for the boys and the reverse for girls. If the intention is to maximize objective runner performance, our findings suggest that the time summation method provides stronger incentive alignment than the rank-summation method in team competition. The general implications are significant for determining optimal incentive structures in team-based production processes with significant spillovers from individual performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Ashby, Nathan J. & Ramos, Miguel A., 2023. "Productivity within groups: An analysis of shirking in high school cross country competitions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:106:y:2023:i:c:s2214804323000964
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102070
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