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Bank levy and bank risk-taking

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  • Diemer, Michael

Abstract

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, several countries implemented a bank levy. This paper studies the impact of different types of bank levies on the risk-taking behaviour of banks competing in the market for secured or unsecured debt à la Hotelling. We differentiate between three types of bank levies: a levy on secured liabilities, a levy on unsecured liabilities and a levy on risk-weighted assets. Banks collect funds and invest in either a prudent or a gambling asset. We find that a levy on secured and unsecured liabilities can prevent banks from investing in the gambling asset. A levy on risk-weighted assets also induces banks to behave more prudently. Such a levy is even more effective than a levy on liabilities if banks are well-capitalized. Finally, a guarantee on debt makes a bank levy more effective.

Suggested Citation

  • Diemer, Michael, 2017. "Bank levy and bank risk-taking," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 10-32.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:revfin:v:34:y:2017:i:c:p:10-32
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rfe.2017.06.001
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    3. Karolina Puławska, 2022. "Taxation of the financial sector: Is a bank levy the answer to the financial crisis?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(4), pages 390-404, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank levy; Competition; Moral hazard; Transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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