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When should the regulator be left alone in the commons? How fishing cooperatives can help ameliorate inefficiencies

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  • Rosas-Munoz, Juan
  • Espinola-Arredondo, Ana
  • Munoz-Garcia, Felix

Abstract

This paper examines a common-pool resource where quotas and fines are set by a regulator, an artisanal organization (cooperative), or both. We analyze the interaction between these two regulatory agencies under a flexible policy regime, where quotas and fines can be revised across periods, and under an inflexible policy regime, where they cannot. We show that inefficiencies arise in the inflexible regime, but they are reduced when the two agencies coexist. Overall, we demonstrate that the artisanal organization may be preferred when environmental damages are low, but the regulator may be preferable otherwise.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosas-Munoz, Juan & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2024. "When should the regulator be left alone in the commons? How fishing cooperatives can help ameliorate inefficiencies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:77:y:2024:i:c:s0928765524000101
    DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101434
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common-pool resource; Regulation; Artisanal organization; Flexible policy; Inflexible policy; Inefficiencies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General

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