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On sharing the costs of public drinking water infrastructure renewal among users with different preferences

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  • Rambonilaza, Tina
  • Rulleau, Bénédicte
  • Assouan, Epiphane

Abstract

•Hybrid water supply associates a centralized network and decentralized systems.•Decentralized systems are operating at the small level (i.e., household).•We examine their implications for the payment by users to renew infrastructure.•We show that they impose a disproportionate cost burden on conservative users.•The introduction of a tax for the use of decentralized systems is envisaged.

Suggested Citation

  • Rambonilaza, Tina & Rulleau, Bénédicte & Assouan, Epiphane, 2023. "On sharing the costs of public drinking water infrastructure renewal among users with different preferences," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:85:y:2023:i:c:s095717872300173x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2023.101661
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