IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeeman/v122y2023ics0095069623001109.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Greed is good? Of equilibrium impacts in environmental regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Vehviläinen, Iivo

Abstract

This paper presents a novel method to quantify the market equilibrium impacts of tighter environmental policies. The approach is taken to evaluate the welfare effects of emerging environmental regulations to protect the biodiversity of river ecosystems that put pressure on reducing hydropower generation capacity. A dataset of 129 million bids in the Nordic electricity market is used to calculate how small reductions in hydropower capacity change market outcomes and surpluses hour-by-hour for the years 2011–2022. Reaching the EU Biodiversity Strategy target of 2030 is estimated to reduce 56 MW of hydropower capacity in Finland. Such a change would lead to quantifiable welfare losses of €62 million over time, not counting environmental benefits. Notably, the producer surplus increases by €318 million over time through electricity market price changes, suggesting that instead of lobbying against biodiversity enhancing regulation, agreeing to an industry-wide implementation could benefit both the environment and the firms. Yet the fact that consumer costs increase more than the mere implementation cost reads as a sign of caution when tighter biodiversity policies are introduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Vehviläinen, Iivo, 2023. "Greed is good? Of equilibrium impacts in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:122:y:2023:i:c:s0095069623001109
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102892
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069623001109
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102892?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Natalia Fabra & Mar Reguant, 2014. "Pass-Through of Emissions Costs in Electricity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2872-2899, September.
    2. James B. Bushnell & Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, 2008. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 237-266, March.
    3. Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, March.
    4. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2009. "Market Power in Pollution Permit Markets," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I).
    5. Gautam Gowrisankaran & Ashley Langer & Wendan Zhang, 2022. "Policy Uncertainty in the Market for Coal Electricity: The Case of Air Toxics Standards," NBER Working Papers 30297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Meredith Fowlie & Mar Reguant & Stephen P. Ryan, 2016. "Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(1), pages 249-302.
    7. Oglend, Atle & Kleppe, Tore Selland, 2017. "On the behavior of commodity prices when speculative storage is bounded," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 52-69.
    8. Angus Deaton & Guy Laroque, 1992. "On the Behaviour of Commodity Prices," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23.
    9. Guojun He & Shaoda Wang & Bing Zhang, 2020. "Watering Down Environmental Regulation in China," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(4), pages 2135-2185.
    10. Severin Borenstein & Stephen Holland, 2005. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Electricity Markets with Time-Invariant Retail Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 469-493, Autumn.
    11. Mar Reguant, 2014. "Complementary Bidding Mechanisms and Startup Costs in Electricity Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1708-1742.
    12. Fabra, Natalia, 2021. "The energy transition: An industrial economics perspective," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    13. Stefan Ambec & Claude Crampes, 2019. "Decarbonizing Electricity Generation with Intermittent Sources of Energy," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(6), pages 1105-1134.
    14. Gautam Gowrisankaran & Stanley S. Reynolds & Mario Samano, 2016. "Intermittency and the Value of Renewable Energy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1187-1234.
    15. Bård Harstad & Torben K. Mideksa, 2017. "Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1708-1734.
    16. Lund, Peter D. & Lindgren, Juuso & Mikkola, Jani & Salpakari, Jyri, 2015. "Review of energy system flexibility measures to enable high levels of variable renewable electricity," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 785-807.
    17. Carter Brandon & Katrina Brandon & Alison Fairbrass & Rachel Neugarten, 2021. "Integrating Natural Capital into National Accounts: Three Decades of Promise and Challenge," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 134-153.
    18. Natalia Fabra & Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing Electricity Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, Spring.
    19. Spulber, Daniel F., 1988. "Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 163-181, March.
    20. Marina Halac & Ilan Kremer & Eyal Winter, 2020. "Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(3), pages 889-921, March.
    21. Evan Kwerel, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601.
    22. Steven L. Puller, 2007. "Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(1), pages 75-87, February.
    23. Stefan Ambec & Joseph A. Doucet, 2003. "Decentralizing hydro power production," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(3), pages 587-607, August.
    24. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting with Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388.
    25. Nicholas Ryan, 2021. "The Competitive Effects of Transmission Infrastructure in the Indian Electricity Market," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 202-242, May.
    26. Beat Hintermann, 2017. "Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 66(1), pages 89-112, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fabra, Natalia, 2021. "The energy transition: An industrial economics perspective," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    2. Bohland, Moritz & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2022. "Renewable support and strategic pricing in electricity markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    3. LaRiviere, Jacob & Lyu, Xueying, 2022. "Transmission constraints, intermittent renewables and welfare," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    4. Matti Liski & Iivo Vehviläinen, 2016. "Gone with the Wind? An Empirical Analysis of the Renewable Energy Rent Transfer," CESifo Working Paper Series 6250, CESifo.
    5. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew & Silveira, Douglas, 2023. "Screening for collusion in wholesale electricity markets: A literature review," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    6. Moritz Bohland & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020. "Technology Policy and Market Structure: Evidence from the Power Sector," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1856, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Koichiro Ito & Mar Reguant, 2016. "Sequential Markets, Market Power, and Arbitrage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(7), pages 1921-1957, July.
    8. Michele Fioretti & Jorge Tamayo, 2021. "Saving for a Dry Day: Coal, Dams, and the Energy Transition," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03389152, HAL.
    9. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew & Eckert, Heather, 2018. "Carbon pricing with an output subsidy under imperfect competition: The case of Alberta's restructured electricity market," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 102-123.
    10. Dickson, Alex & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2018. "Strategic trade in pollution permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 94-113.
    11. Holmberg, Pär & Tangerås, Thomas & Ahlqvist, Victor, 2018. "Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series 1257, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 27 Mar 2019.
    12. Bouckaert, Jan & Van Moer, Geert, 2017. "Horizontal subcontracting and investment in idle dispatchable power plants," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 307-332.
    13. David P. Brown & David E. M. Sappington, 2022. "Vertical integration and capacity investment in the electricity sector," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 193-226, February.
    14. Pio Baake & Sebastian Schwenen & Christian von Hirschhausen, 2020. "Local Power Markets," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1904, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    15. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/1qif9fqehq930ovnr511k1el4f is not listed on IDEAS
    16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1qif9fqehq930ovnr511k1el4f is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Carsten Helm & Mathias Mier, 2020. "Steering the Energy Transition in a World of Intermittent Electricity Supply: Optimal Subsidies and Taxes for Renewables Storage," ifo Working Paper Series 330, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    18. David P. Brown & Andrew Eckert, 2018. "Analyzing the Impact of Electricity Market Structure Changes and Mergers: The Importance of Forward Commitments," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-137, February.
    19. Stefan Lamp & Mario Samano, 2023. "(Mis)allocation of Renewable Energy Sources," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(1), pages 195-229.
    20. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew & Shaffer, Blake, 2023. "Evaluating the impact of divestitures on competition: Evidence from Alberta’s wholesale electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    21. Willems, Bert & Pollitt, Michael & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik & Banet, Catherine, 2022. "The European Wholesale Electricty Market: From Crisis to Net Zero," Other publications TiSEM 2f225964-853e-4d30-a46d-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    22. Takayoshi Shinkuma & Hajime Sugeta, 2022. "Trial runs as environmental policy with strategic firms," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 24(2), pages 285-303, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental regulation; Electricity markets; Biodiversity conservation; Cost incidence; Hydropower; Storage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:122:y:2023:i:c:s0095069623001109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.