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Liability or labeling? Regulating product risks with costly consumer attention

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  • Arbatskaya, Maria
  • Aslam, Maria Vyshnya

Abstract

This paper examines the liability and labeling approaches to regulating product safety. Stronger product liability increases producer care, which then has a negative “lulling effect” on consumer attention to warning labels. By contrast, more visible warning labels increase such consumer care, which then has a positive “vigilance effect” on producer care. Information campaigns educating consumers about product risks generate a similar vigilance effect. This happens because consumers view producer care and consumer care levels as strategic substitutes, while the firm views them as strategic complements. We argue that when a public policy is chosen, the endogeneity of consumer attention to warnings is not to be overlooked.

Suggested Citation

  • Arbatskaya, Maria & Aslam, Maria Vyshnya, 2018. "Liability or labeling? Regulating product risks with costly consumer attention," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 238-252.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:154:y:2018:i:c:p:238-252
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.08.016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Warning labels; Product labeling regulation; Mandatory disclosure; Product liability; Economics of attention;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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