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Prize and incentives in double-elimination tournaments

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  • Huang, Lingbo

Abstract

I examine a game-theoretical model of two variants of double-elimination tournaments, and derive the equilibrium behavior of symmetric players and the optimal prize allocation assuming a designer aims to maximize total effort. I compare these theoretical properties to the well-known single-elimination tournament.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Lingbo, 2016. "Prize and incentives in double-elimination tournaments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 116-120.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:116-120
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.035
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Deck, Cary & Kimbrough, Erik O., 2015. "Single- and double-elimination all-pay tournaments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 416-429.
    2. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daria Tabashnikova & Marina Sandomirskaia, 2023. "The Optimal Design Of Elimination Tournaments With A Superstar," HSE Working papers WP BRP 263/EC/2023, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Eric Mao, 2023. "The Incentive Effects of Tournaments and Peer Effects in Team Production: Evidence from Esports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 24(2), pages 174-192, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Double elimination tournaments; Single elimination tournaments; Optimal prize allocation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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