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Why Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less: Holding Costs, Bargaining Power or Stigma?

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  • Geoffrey K. Turnbull
  • Velma Zahirovic‐Herbert

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  • Geoffrey K. Turnbull & Velma Zahirovic‐Herbert, 2011. "Why Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less: Holding Costs, Bargaining Power or Stigma?," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 39(1), pages 19-43, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:39:y:2011:i:1:p:19-43
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xun Bian & Raymond Brastow & Bennie Waller & Scott Wentland, 2021. "Foreclosure Externalities and Home Liquidity," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(3), pages 876-916, September.
    2. Paul E. Carrillo & Eric R. Wit & William Larson, 2015. "Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(3), pages 609-651, September.
    3. Shimizu, Chihiro & Nishimura, Kiyohiko G. & Watanabe, Tsutomu, 2016. "House prices at different stages of the buying/selling process," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 37-53.
    4. Velma Zahirovic-Herbert & Bennie D. Waller & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2020. "Properties that Sell at or above Listing Price: Strategic Pricing, Better Broker or Just Dumb Luck?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 53-76, February.
    5. Geoffrey K. Turnbull & Arno J. van der Vlist, 2022. "Bargaining power and segmented markets: Evidence from rental and owner‐occupied housing," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1307-1333, September.
    6. Cocker Liu & Adam Nowak & Patrick Smith, 2017. "Some Remarks on Real Estate Pricing," Working Papers 17-20, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    7. Randy E. Dumm & Charles Nyce & G. Stacy Sirmans & Greg T. Smersh, 2022. "Pricing Moral Hazard in Residential Properties: The Impact of Sinkhole Claims on House Prices," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 30-70, January.
    8. Cynthia Holmes & Jia Xie, 2018. "Distortions in Real Estate Transactions with Out-of-State Participants," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 592-617, November.
    9. Randy Anderson & Raymond Brastow & Geoffrey Turnbull & Bennie Waller, 2014. "Seller Over-Pricing and Listing Contract Length: The Effects of Endogenous Listing Contracts on Housing Markets," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 434-450, October.
    10. Crocker H. Liu & Adam Nowak & Patrick S. Smith, 2018. "Does the Asset Pricing Premium Reflect Asymmetric or Incomplete Information?," Working Papers 18-06, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    11. Kenneth Soyeh & Jonathan Wiley & Ken Johnson, 2014. "Do Buyer Incentives Work for Houses during a Real Estate Downturn?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 380-396, February.

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