An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6229.2008.00205.x
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Other versions of this item:
- Matthew J. Baker & Thomas Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, 2004. "An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws," Working papers 2004-26, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Matthew J. Baker & Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, 2006. "An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws," Working papers 2006-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lynn Fisher, 2006. "Renegotiation in the Common Law Mortgage and the Impact of Equitable Redemption," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 61-82, February.
- Jaffe, Austin J & Sharp, Jeffery M, 1996. "Contract Theory and Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 77-96, January.
- Hynes, Richard M & Malani, Anup & Posner, Eric A, 2004. "The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(1), pages 19-43, April.
- Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 473-494.
- Miceli, Thomas J & Sirmans, C F, 1995. "The Economics of Land Transfer and Title Insurance," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 81-88, January.
- Matthew Baker & Thomas Miceli & C. F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2001. "Property Rights by Squatting: Land Ownership Risk and Adverse Possession Statutes," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(3), pages 360-370.
- Friedman, Gerald, 1985. "The Labor History Reader. Edited by Daniel J. Leab. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1985. The Working Class in American History. Pp. xx, 470. $29.95 cloth, $12.50 paper," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 1013-1014, December.
- Alston, Lee J, 1984. "Farm Foreclosure Moratorium Legislation: A Lesson from the Past," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 445-457, June.
- repec:rus:hseeco:70502 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Brox, James A., 2009. "Too Small to Fail: Canadian Banks, Regulation, and the North American Financial Crisis," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 31-46.
- Andra Ghent, 2014. "How Do Case Law and Statute Differ? Lessons from the Evolution of Mortgage Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 1085-1122.
- Bruce Gordon & Daniel Winkler, 2015. "Statutory Right of Redemption and the Selling Price of Foreclosed Houses," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 365-397, October.
- James A. Brox, 2010. "Canadian Banks and the North American Housing Crisis," Chapters, in: Benton E. Gup (ed.), The Financial and Economic Crises, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Lynn Fisher, 2006. "Renegotiation in the Common Law Mortgage and the Impact of Equitable Redemption," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 61-82, February.
- Lynn Fisher & Abdullah Yavas, 2007. "The Value of Equitable Redemption in Commercial Mortgage Contracting," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 411-425, November.
- Jou, Jyh-Bang & Lee, Tan (Charlene), 2016. "How does statutory redemption affect a buyer's decision at the foreclosure sale?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 263-272.
- Zhu, Shuang & Pace, R. Kelley, 2015. "Factors underlying short sales," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 60-70.
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JEL classification:
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
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