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The Coal Mine Mafia of India: A Mirror of Corporate Power

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  • Yugank Goyal

Abstract

An investigation of the source of power of mafia†type organizations may reveal how other non†state actors can operate as if they are independent of the state. This study of the coal mafia in Dhanbad, India shows that power often derives from socially hierarchical relationships involving debt and/or caste. It also demonstrates how state policies that are thoughtlessly implemented may solidify existing hierarchies. By analogy, modern corporations gain some of their power by behaving as if they were semi†sovereign institutions that draw their strength informally from social networks and other extralegal relationships. The mafia in the Dhanbad coalfields emerged through a series of institutional changes. Labor shortages were initially resolved by labor intermediaries, who eventually controlled the labor through linkages associated with debt, caste, and social obligations. These intermediaries eventually assumed official positions in labor unions, which gave them a platform for electoral politics. When the coal industry was nationalized, the union leaders further solidified their position in the nationalized corporation. In this way, private labor intermediaries became local political leaders who controlled the state apparatus to some extent. Corporations follow similar patterns. Both mafias and corporations exploit weak governments, collude with them, and often operate with a high degree of independence. Like mafias, corporations often derive their power from socially embedded networks that they craft in local communities and populations. Because the roots of their influence are embedded in social networks, simple legal and regulatory changes are often insufficient to limit their power. Transnational corporations engaged in extraction of natural resources share with mafias the ability to leverage monopoly power in one domain into control of other domains. As a result, this case study of the coal mafia in India offers a unique entry point to understand corporate sovereignty.

Suggested Citation

  • Yugank Goyal, 2018. "The Coal Mine Mafia of India: A Mirror of Corporate Power," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(2), pages 541-574, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:77:y:2018:i:2:p:541-574
    DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12208
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yugank Goyal & Klaus Heine, 2021. "Why do informal markets remain informal: the role of tacit knowledge in an Indian footwear cluster," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 639-659, April.
    2. Upadhyay, Saurabh, 2023. "Impact of the formal and informal institutions on the performance of Indian mining companies: A fuzzy set QCA analysis," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).

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