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International Environmental Agreements

Author

Listed:
  • Aart de Zeeuw

    (Tilburg Sustainability Center, Department of Economics, Tilburg University, 5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands)

Abstract

The regulation of environmental externalities at the global level requires international agreements between sovereign states. Game theory provides an appropriate theoretical tool for analysis. However, game theory can result in a wide range of outcomes, and therefore it is important to discuss the assumptions and mechanisms of the different approaches and to relate these with what is observed in practice. The basic picture is not optimistic: If there are large gains of cooperation, the stable coalition is small. This grim picture challenges the perspective and design of international agreements. This article discusses and compares the different approaches: noncooperative, cooperative, dynamic, and evolutionary. Asymmetries and the options for side payments are considered. At the end, some more optimistic ways forward are presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Aart de Zeeuw, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 151-168, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:anr:reseco:v:7:y:2015:p:151-168
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    File URL: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-resource-100814-124943
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis & Stefania Strantza, 2018. "International Environmental Agreements - Stability with Transfers among Countries," Discussion Paper Series 2018_06, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised May 2018.
    2. Sareh Vosooghi & Maria Arvaniti & Rick van der Ploeg, 2022. "Self-Enforcing Climate Coalitions for Farsighted Countries: Integrated Analysis of Heterogeneous Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 9768, CESifo.
    3. Alessandro Tavoni & Ralph Winkler, 2021. "Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 225-243, October.
    4. Carattini, Stefano & Fankhauser, Sam & Gao, Jianjian & Gennaioli, Caterina & Panzarasa, Pietro, 2023. "What does network analysis teach us about international environmental cooperation?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    5. Tiziano Distefano & Simone D'Alessandro, 2017. "An Evolutionary approach to International Environmental Agreements," SEEDS Working Papers 0517, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, revised Sep 2017.
    6. Steffen Mohrenberg & Vally Koubi & Thomas Bernauer, 2019. "Effects of funding mechanisms on participation in multilateral environmental agreements," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-18, February.
    7. Jan Kersting & Vicki Duscha & Matthias Weitzel, 2017. "Cooperation on Climate Change under Economic Linkages: How the Inclusion of Macroeconomic Effects Affects Stability of a Global Climate Coalition," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4).
    8. Spycher, Sarah & Winkler, Ralph, 2022. "Strategic delegation in the formation of modest international environmental agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    9. Stefano Carattini & Simon Levin & Alessandro Tavoni, 2019. "Cooperation in the Climate Commons," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(2), pages 227-247.
    10. Scott Barrett, 2022. "A Biodiversity Hotspots Treaty: The Road not Taken," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 83(4), pages 937-954, December.
    11. Karp, Larry & Sakamoto, Hiroaki, 2021. "Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    12. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis & Stefania Strantza, 2018. "International Environmental Agreements - Stability with Transfers among Countries," Working Papers 2018.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    13. McEvoy, David M. & McGinty, Matthew, 2018. "Negotiating a uniform emissions tax in international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 217-231.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    global pollution; games; noncooperative; cooperative; dynamics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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