Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20190307
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Other versions of this item:
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching," Post-Print halshs-03029897, HAL.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03029897, HAL.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Qianfeng Tang & Yongchao Zhang, 2021. "Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 533-552, March.
- Julien Grenet & YingHua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022.
"Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(6), pages 1427-1476.
- Grenet, Julien & He, YingHua & Kübler, Dorothea, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 130(6), pages 1-1.
- Julien Grenet & Yinghua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," Post-Print halshs-03761513, HAL.
- Julien Grenet & Yinghua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," Working Papers halshs-02146792, HAL.
- Julien Grenet & Yinghua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," PSE Working Papers halshs-02146792, HAL.
- Julien Grenet & Yinghua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03761513, HAL.
- Atay, Ata & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2022.
"Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching,"
LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE
2022028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2022. "Limited farsightedness in priority-based matching," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/438, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2022. "Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching," Papers 2212.07427, arXiv.org.
- Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo, 2023.
"The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 515-528.
- Josue Ortega & Thilo Klein, 2022. "The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice," Papers 2204.07255, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
- Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Dur, 2023. "Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(2), pages 321-338, April.
- Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2023. "School Choice with Multiple Priorities," Papers 2308.04780, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
- Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2022.
"Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ?,"
Working Papers ECARES
2022-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2024. "Respecting Priorities versus Respecting Preferences In School Choice: When is there a Trade-off?," Working Papers ECARES 2024-03, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2024.
"School choice with transferable student characteristics,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 103-124.
- Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez & Antonio Romero Medina, 2020. "School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2020-04, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
- Matsui, Akihiko & Murakami, Megumi, 2022. "Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 50-65.
- de Callatay, Pierre & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2021. "Minimally Farsighted Unstable Networks," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Julien Combe, 2023.
"Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 551-584, August.
- Julien Combe, 2022. "Reallocation with Priorities and Minimal Envy Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03951678, HAL.
- Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers, 2020.
"Blocking Pairs versus Blocking Students : Stability Comparisons in School Choice,"
Cahiers de recherche
04-2020, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers, 2020. "Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice," Cahiers de recherche 2020-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Zhiyi Xu & Robert G. Hammond, 2024. "Designing school choice mechanisms: A structural model and demand estimation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(2), pages 505-524, April.
- Peng Shi, 2022. "Optimal Priority-Based Allocation Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(1), pages 171-188, January.
- Mustafa Oguz Afacan & Umut Dur & A. Arda Gitmez & Ozgur Y{i}lmaz, 2022. "Improving the Deferred Acceptance with Minimal Compromise," Papers 2205.00032, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022.
"School Choice,"
Working Papers
2022:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aram Grigoryan, 2023. "Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 383-396, April.
- Siwei Chen & Yajing Chen & Chia-Ling Hsu, 2021. "New axioms for top trading cycles," Papers 2104.09157, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.
- Peter Troyan, 2022. "Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism," Papers 2206.11359, arXiv.org.
- Siwei Chen & Yajing Chen & Chia‐Ling Hsu, 2023. "New axioms for top trading cycles," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 1064-1077, October.
- Valant, Jon & Walker, Brigham, 2024. "Setting Priorities in School Choice Enrollment Systems: Who Benefits from Placement Algorithm Preferences?," IZA Discussion Papers 16776, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Nick Arnosti, 2023. "Lottery Design for School Choice," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 244-259, January.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
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