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Marchés Internationaux de Droits à Polluer et Taxes Locales sur les Biens Polluants

Author

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  • Daubanes, Julien

    (Université de Genève (GSEM) et CESifo)

  • Lasserre, Pierre

    (Université du Québec à Montréal, CIRANO et CIREQ)

Abstract

L’intérêt des marchés internationaux de droits à polluer réside dans leur potentiel à atteindre un objectif de réduction de pollution de manière efficiente. Malheureusement, la tendance des pays participants à taxer localement les biens polluants remet en cause ce potentiel. Nous proposons un modèle permettant d’examiner l’intérêt des pays participant à un marché de droits à polluer à taxer le bien qui génère la pollution. En particulier, cet intérêt dépend de la distribution initiale des droits entre les pays participants. Nous montrons comment les droits doivent être alloués aux différents pays participants de sorte à garantir l’efficience du marché. Ces allocations optimales requièrent de distribuer gratuitement une fraction suffisamment large des droits plutôt que de les mettre aux enchères.

Suggested Citation

  • Daubanes, Julien & Lasserre, Pierre, 2019. "Marchés Internationaux de Droits à Polluer et Taxes Locales sur les Biens Polluants," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 95(2-3), pages 269-286, Juin-Sept.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:0194
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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