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Glynis Gawn

Personal Details

First Name:Glynis
Middle Name:
Last Name:Gawn
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RePEc Short-ID:pga941
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Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of California-Merced

Merced, California (United States)
http://economics.ucmerced.edu/
RePEc:edi:ecucmus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Gawn, Glynis & Rausser, Gordon C. & Zilberman, David D., 1989. "A model of nutrient demand and the allocation of time," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt0kv4w9qq, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.

Articles

  1. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2021. "Machiavelli Preferences Without Blame: Delegating Selfish vs. Generous Decisions in Dictator Games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
  2. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2019. "Lying through others: Does delegation promote deception?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 59-73.
  3. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2019. "Who delegates? Evidence from dictator games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 186-189.
  4. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2018. "Language and lies," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 167-176.
  5. Glynis Gawn & Robert Innes, 2018. "Do Lies Erode Trust?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(1), pages 137-161, February.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

    Sorry, no citations of working papers recorded.

Articles

  1. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2021. "Machiavelli Preferences Without Blame: Delegating Selfish vs. Generous Decisions in Dictator Games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Argenton, Cedric & Potters, Jan & Yang, Yadi, 2022. "Receiving Credit : On Delegation and Responsibility," Discussion Paper 2022-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    2. Florian Engl, 2022. "A Theory of Causal Responsibility Attribution," CESifo Working Paper Series 9898, CESifo.
    3. Innes, Robert, 2022. "Does deception raise or lower lie aversion? Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    4. Mathieu Chevrier & Vincent Teixeira, 2024. "Algorithm Control and Responsibility: Shifting Blame to the User?," GREDEG Working Papers 2024-04, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.

  2. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2019. "Lying through others: Does delegation promote deception?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 59-73.

    Cited by:

    1. Argenton, Cedric & Potters, Jan & Yang, Yadi, 2022. "Receiving Credit : On Delegation and Responsibility," Discussion Paper 2022-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    2. Buckle, Georgia E. & Füllbrunn, Sascha & Luhan, Wolfgang J., 2021. "Lying for others: The impact of agency on misreporting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    3. Hermann, Daniel & Brenig, Mattheus, 2022. "Dishonest online: A distinction between observable and unobservable lying," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    4. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2021. "Machiavelli Preferences Without Blame: Delegating Selfish vs. Generous Decisions in Dictator Games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    5. Innes, Robert, 2022. "Does deception raise or lower lie aversion? Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    6. Burro, Giovanni & Castagnetti, Alessandro, 2022. "Will I tell you that you are smart (dumb)? Deceiving Others about their IQ or about a Random Draw," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 100(C).

  3. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2019. "Who delegates? Evidence from dictator games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 186-189.

    Cited by:

    1. Ezquerra, Lara & Kujal, Praveen, 2020. "Self-selecting into being a dictator: Distributional consequences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    2. Argenton, Cedric & Potters, Jan & Yang, Yadi, 2022. "Receiving Credit : On Delegation and Responsibility," Discussion Paper 2022-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    3. Hausfeld, Jan & Fischbacher, Urs & Knoch, Daria, 2020. "The value of decision-making power in social decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 898-912.
    4. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2021. "Machiavelli Preferences Without Blame: Delegating Selfish vs. Generous Decisions in Dictator Games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    5. Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian & Timofeyev, Yuriy, 2022. "Utilitarian or deontological models of moral behavior—What predicts morally questionable decisions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).

  4. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2018. "Language and lies," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 167-176.

    Cited by:

    1. Damien, Besancenot & Radu, Vranceanu, 2019. "Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence," ESSEC Working Papers WP1907, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.

  5. Glynis Gawn & Robert Innes, 2018. "Do Lies Erode Trust?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(1), pages 137-161, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Dugar, Subhasish & Mitra, Arnab & Shahriar, Quazi, 2019. "Deception: The role of uncertain consequences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-18.
    2. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2018. "Language and lies," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 167-176.
    3. Radu Vranceanu & Delphine Dubart, 2019. "Experimental evidence on deceitful communication: does everyone have a price ?," Working Papers hal-01822814, HAL.
    4. Robert Innes, 2017. "Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 107-131, October.
    5. Vranceanu, Radu & Dubart, Delphine, 2019. "Deceitful communication in a sender-receiver experiment: Does everyone have a price?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 43-52.
    6. Chadi, Adrian & Homolka, Konstantin, 2022. "Little Lies and Blind Eyes – Experimental Evidence on Cheating and Task Performance in Work Groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 199(C), pages 122-159.
    7. Innes, Robert, 2022. "Does deception raise or lower lie aversion? Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

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