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Oindrila De

Personal Details

First Name:Oindrila
Middle Name:
Last Name:De
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pde701
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://iegindia.org/team/oindrila-de/
Delhi India
Terminal Degree: Centre for Competition Policy; University of East Anglia (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Institute of Economic Growth

Delhi, India
http://www.iegindia.org/
RePEc:edi:ieudein (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. Aditya Bhattacharjea & Oindrila De, 2021. "India’s Cartel Penalty Practices, Optimal Restitution and Deterrence," IEG Working Papers 424, Institute of Economic Growth.
  2. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Oindrila De & Stephan Martin, 2013. "Product Quality and Business Contracts: Intermediary Crude Oil Pricing in a Southwest-US Regional Market," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-06, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  3. Stephen Davies & Oindrila De, 2012. "Ringleaders in larger numbers, asymmetric cartels," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2012-10, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

Articles

  1. Aditya Bhattacharjea & Oindrila De & Geeta Gouri, 2019. "Competition Law and Competition Policy in India: How the Competition Commission has Dealt with Anticompetitive Restraints by Government Entities," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 221-250, March.
  2. Stephen Davies & Oindrila De, 2013. "Ringleaders in Larger Number Asymmetric Cartels," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 524-544, November.
  3. Oindrila De, 2010. "Analysis of Cartel Duration: Evidence from EC Prosecuted Cartels," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 33-65.

Chapters

  1. Aditya Bhattacharjea & Oindrila De, 2023. "Neither Crime Nor (Much) Punishment: India’s Cartel Penalty Practices," Springer Books, in: Kaushik Basu & Ajit Mishra (ed.), Law and Economic Development, chapter 0, pages 225-256, Springer.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Stephen Davies & Oindrila De, 2012. "Ringleaders in larger numbers, asymmetric cartels," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2012-10, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

    Cited by:

    1. Rau, Holger & Clemens, Georg, 2014. "Do Leniency Policies facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100509, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Capuano, Carlo & Grassi, Iacopo, 2018. "Patent Protection and Threat of Litigation in Oligopoly," EconStor Preprints 175243, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    3. Schivardi, Fabiano & Barone, Guglielmo & Sette, Enrico, 2022. "Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 14654, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Stephen Davies & Franco Mariuzzo & Peter L. Ormosi, 2018. "Quantifying The Deterrent Effect Of Anticartel Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 1933-1949, October.
    5. Clemens, Georg & Rau, Holger A., 2014. "Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 130, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    6. Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2021. "The leniency rule revisited: Experiments on cartel formation with open communication," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 76, pages 1-1.
    7. Chen, Zhiqi & Ghosh, Subhadip & Ross, Thomas W., 2015. "Denying leniency to cartel instigators: Costs and benefits," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 19-29.
    8. Ormazabal, Gaizka & Ferrés, Daniel & Sertsios, Giorgio & Povel, Paul, 2017. "Capital Structure Under Collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 12151, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Stefan Napel & Dominik Welter, 2017. "Responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages," Working Papers 171, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    10. Franco Mariuzzo & Peter Ormosi & Zherou Majied, 2019. "Public and reputational sanctions: The case of cartels," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2018-06v3, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    11. Timothy Flannery & Siyu Wang, 2023. "Is the “smoke‐filled room” necessary? An experimental study of the effect of communication networks on collusion," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(4), pages 1056-1077, April.
    12. Robert M. Feinberg & Hyunchul Kim & Minsoo Park, 2016. "The Determinants of Cartel Duration in Korea," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(4), pages 433-448, June.
    13. Mariuzzo, Franco & Ormosi, Peter L & Majied, Zherou, 2020. "Fines and reputational sanctions: The case of cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    14. Juan Luis Jiménez & Manuel Ojeda-Cabral & José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, 2023. "Who Blows the Whistle on Cartels? Finding the Leniency Applicant at the European Commission," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 123-153, September.
    15. Georg Clemens & Holger A. Rau, 2019. "Do discriminatory leniency policies fight hard‐core cartels?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 336-354, April.
    16. Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2014. "Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 159, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

Articles

  1. Stephen Davies & Oindrila De, 2013. "Ringleaders in Larger Number Asymmetric Cartels," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 524-544, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Oindrila De, 2010. "Analysis of Cartel Duration: Evidence from EC Prosecuted Cartels," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 33-65.

    Cited by:

    1. María C. Avramovich, 2020. "The Welfare Implications of the Meeting Design of a Cartel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(1), pages 59-83, August.
    2. Joan-Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez & Carmen García, 2014. "Evaluating Antitrust Leniency Programs," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 107-136.
    3. Chen, Zhiqi & Ghosh, Subhadip & Ross, Thomas W., 2015. "Denying leniency to cartel instigators: Costs and benefits," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 19-29.
    4. Zhou, Jun, 2011. "Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 353, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    5. Tebbe, Eva, 2018. "Once bitten, twice shy? Market size affects the effectiveness of a leniency program by (de-)activating hysteresis effects," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168304, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, revised 2018.
    6. Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2017. "When do firms leave cartels? Determinants and the impact on cartel survival," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-002, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Spiegel, Yossi & Heim, Sven & , & ,, 2018. "Minority share acquisitions and collusion: evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs," CEPR Discussion Papers 13327, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Polemis, Michael, 2024. "Are Cartels Forever? Global Evidence Using Quantile Regression Analysis," MPRA Paper 120534, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Zhou, J., 2012. "Endogenous Lysine Strategy Profile and Cartel Duration : An Instrumental Variables Approach," Discussion Paper 2012-009, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    10. Jun Zhou, 2016. "The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement," Working Papers 13042, Bruegel.
    11. Robert M. Feinberg & Hyunchul Kim & Minsoo Park, 2016. "The Determinants of Cartel Duration in Korea," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(4), pages 433-448, June.
    12. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Yanhao Wei, 2014. "What Can the Duration of Discovered Cartels Tell Us About the Duration of Cartels?," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-042, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    13. Marvao, Catarina & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2016. "Cartels and Leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt," SITE Working Paper Series 39, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, revised 16 Nov 2016.
    14. Annabelle Jochem & Pierpaolo Parrotta & Giacomo Valletta, 2020. "The impact of the 2002 reform of the EU leniency program on cartel outcomes," Post-Print hal-03131313, HAL.
    15. Wawa W. Nkosi & Willem H. Boshoff, 2022. "Characteristics of Prosecuted Cartels and Cartel Enforcement in South Africa," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(3), pages 327-360, May.
    16. Adam Karbowski, 2020. "A Note on Patents and Leniency," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1, pages 97-108.
    17. Hoang, Cung Truong & Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Smuda, Florian, 2014. "Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-043, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    18. Lucas Campio Pinha & Marcelo José Braga, 2019. "Evaluating the effectiveness of the Brazilian Leniency Program," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(3), pages 1860-1869.
    19. Zhou, J., 2012. "Endogenous Lysine Strategy Profile and Cartel Duration : An Instrumental Variables Approach," Other publications TiSEM 07e13758-7077-436a-b7d9-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    20. Joan-Ramon Borrell & Carmen García & Juan Luis Jiménez & José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, 2022. ""Cartel destabilization effect of leniency programs"," IREA Working Papers 202213, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Sep 2022.
    21. Michelle Sovinsky, 2022. "Do Research Joint Ventures Serve a Collusive Function?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 430-475.
    22. Hubert Buch-Hansen & Clement Levallois, 2015. "The Scale and Geography of Collusion in the European Market: A Longitudinal View," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 737-752, July.
    23. Peter T. Dijkstra & Jonathan Frisch, 2018. "Sanctions and Leniency to Individuals, and its Impact on Cartel Discoveries: Evidence from the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 111-134, March.
    24. Aditya Bhattacharjea & Oindrila De, 2021. "India’s Cartel Penalty Practices, Optimal Restitution and Deterrence," IEG Working Papers 424, Institute of Economic Growth.

Chapters

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More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2022-05-23
  2. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2022-05-23

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