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Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment

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Cited by:

  1. Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2023. "Women and Governance: Central Bank Boards and Monetary Policy," Trinity Economics Papers tep1123, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
  2. Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 145-207, January.
  3. Thornton, John & Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis, 2017. "Inflation targeting and the cyclicality of monetary policy," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 296-302.
  4. Potrafke, Niklas, 2013. "Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 180-187.
  5. Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom & Noth, Felix, 2016. "Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145803, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  6. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2018. "Economic and political drivers of the duration of credit booms," NIPE Working Papers 15/2018, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
  7. Jan Marc Berk & Beata Bierut, 2004. "On the Optimality of Decisions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-120/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Debortoli, Davide & Maih, Junior & Nunes, Ricardo, 2014. "Loose Commitment In Medium-Scale Macroeconomic Models: Theory And Applications," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 175-198, January.
  9. Bennani, Hamza & Kranz, Tobias & Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2018. "Disagreement between FOMC members and the Fed’s staff: New insights based on a counterfactual interest rate," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 139-153.
  10. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
  11. Nagel, Stefan & Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Yan, Zhen, 2017. "The Making of Hawks and Doves: Inflation Experiences on the FOMC," CEPR Discussion Papers 11902, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2016. "Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1512, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  13. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  14. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Michael Ellis & D. Eric Schansberg, 2000. "The determinants of tenure on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors: should I stay or should I go?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(2), pages 231-237.
  16. Matthias Neuenkirch & Peter Tillmann, 2016. "Does A Good Central Banker Make A Difference?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1541-1560, July.
  17. Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2015. "Party affiliation rather than former occupation: the background of central bank governors and its effect on monetary policy," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(17), pages 1424-1429, November.
  18. Guido Schultefrankenfeld, 2020. "Appropriate monetary policy and forecast disagreement at the FOMC," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 223-255, January.
  19. Davide Debortoli & Aeimit Lakdawala, 2016. "How Credible Is the Federal Reserve? A Structural Estimation of Policy Re-optimizations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 42-76, July.
  20. Chappell, Henry W. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 2018. "Committee decision-making at Sweden's Riksbank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 120-133.
  21. Gerard H. Kuper, 2018. "The powers that are: central bank independence in the Greenspan era," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 485-499, March.
  22. Emile van Ommeren & Giulia Piccillo, 2021. "The Central Bank Governor and Interest Rate Setting by Committee," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 67(2), pages 155-185.
  23. Hamza Bennani, 2012. "National influences inside the ECB: an assessment from central bankers' statements," Working Papers hal-00992646, HAL.
  24. Dodge Cahan & Luisa Doerr & Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 215-238, December.
  25. Manuela Moschella & Nicola M Diodati, 2020. "Does politics drive conflict in central banks’ committees? Lifting the veil on the European Central Bank consensus," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 183-203, June.
  26. Favaretto, Federico & Masciandaro, Donato, 2016. "Doves, hawks and pigeons: Behavioral monetary policy and interest rate inertia," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 50-58.
  27. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Mahieu, Ronald & Raes, Louis, 2018. "Inferring hawks and doves from voting records," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 107-120.
  28. Hartmann, Matthias & Conrad, Christian, 2014. "Cross sectional evidence on the relation between monetary policy, macroeconomic conditions and low-frequency inflation uncertainty," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100477, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  29. Kuper, Gerard & Veurink, Jan Hessel, 2014. "Central bank independence and political pressure in the Greenspan era," Research Report 14020-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
  30. Thomas Havrilesky, 1994. "Outside Influences On Monetary Policy: A Summary Of Recent Findings," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(1), pages 46-51, January.
  31. David-Jan Jansen & Richhild Moessner, 2016. "Communicating dissent on monetary policy: Evidence from central bank minutes," DNB Working Papers 512, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  32. Federico M. Giesenow & Jakob de Haan, 2019. "The influence of government ideology on monetary policy: New cross‐country evidence based on dynamic heterogeneous panels," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 216-239, July.
  33. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Mahieu, Ronald & Raes, Louis, 2015. "Hawks and Doves at the FOMC," CEPR Discussion Papers 10442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  34. Donato Masciandaro, 2023. "How Elastic and Predictable Money Should Be: Flexible Monetary Policy Rules from the Great Moderation to the New Normal Times (1993-2023)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23196, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  35. Henry W. Chappell & William Greene & Mark N. Harris & Christopher Spencer, 2022. "Uncertainty and the Bank of England's MPC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(4), pages 825-858, June.
  36. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
  37. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2019. "Political and Institutional Determinants of Credit Booms," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 81(5), pages 1144-1178, October.
  38. Lindner, Axel, 2000. "Long-term appointment of central bankers: costs and benefits," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 639-654, November.
  39. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R & Uribe-McGuire, Alicia, 2021. "Allies or Commitment Devices? A Model of Appointments to the Federal Reserve," SocArXiv b5zts, Center for Open Science.
  40. Dodge Cahan & Niklas Potrafke, 2021. "The Democrat-Republican presidential growth gap and the partisan balance of the state governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 577-601, December.
  41. Mark Harris & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2011. "A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 413-442, March.
  42. Rob Roy McGregor, 1996. "Fomc Voting Behavior And Electoral Cycles: Partisan Ideology And Partisan Loyalty," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 17-32, March.
  43. Daniel L. Thornton & David C. Wheelock, 2014. "Making sense of dissents: a history of FOMC dissents," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 96(3), pages 213-227.
  44. Christopher Spencer, 2006. "Reaction Functions of Bank of England MPC Members: Insiders versus Outsiders," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0606, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  45. Tony Caporale & Harold Wintert, 2002. "A Positive Political Model of Supreme Court Economic Decisions," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(3), pages 693-702, January.
  46. Vanderhart, Peter G., 2000. "The Federal Reserve's Reaction Function under Greenspan: An Ordinal Probit Analysis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 631-644, October.
  47. Thomas L. Hogan, 2022. "The calculus of dissent: Bias and diversity in FOMC projections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 105-135, April.
  48. Caporale, Tony & Grier, Kevin B, 1998. "A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 409-428, October.
  49. Henry W. Chappell & Rob Roy McGregor, 2000. "A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(4), pages 906-922, April.
  50. Malmendier, Ulrike & Nagel, Stefan & Yan, Zhen, 2021. "The making of hawks and doves," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 19-42.
  51. Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom, 2017. "Career experience, political effects, and voting behavior in the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 55-58.
  52. Jordan, Jerry L. & Luther, William J., 2022. "Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 510-515.
  53. Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
  54. Carsten Hefeker, 2019. "Political polarization, term length and too much delegation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 50-69, March.
  55. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Amihai Glazer, 1996. "Politics With And Without Policy†," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 251-265, November.
  56. Neuenkirch, Matthias & Tillmann, Peter, 2014. "Superstar Central Bankers," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100489, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  57. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  58. Lähner, Tom, 2015. "Inconsistent voting behavior in the FOMC," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-546, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  59. Hamza Bennani, 2015. "Dissecting the brains of central bankers: The case of the ECB’s Governing Council members on reforms," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 141, pages 97-114.
  60. José I. García de Paso, 1993. "Central Bank Structure and monetary policy uncertainty," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 9314, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
  61. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2021. "What drives the duration of credit booms?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 1531-1549, January.
  62. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2021. "Why are credit booms sometimes sweet and sometimes sour?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 3054-3074, April.
  63. Salter, Alexander W. & Smith, Daniel J., 2019. "Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of fed policy under burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
  64. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  65. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  66. repec:dgr:rugsom:14020-eef is not listed on IDEAS
  67. Gernot Sieg & Irem Batool, 2012. "Pakistan, Politics and Political Business Cycles," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 51(2), pages 153-166.
  68. J.B Crihfield & J.H. Wood, 1995. "Private goals and monetary policy: inflation and resignations from the Federal Reserve Board," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(195), pages 441-460.
  69. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, March.
  70. Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom & Noth, Felix, 2018. "Regional banking instability and FOMC voting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 282-292.
  71. Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2020. "Do Women Matter in Monetary Policy Boards?," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 20148, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  72. Garcia De Paso, Jose I., 2000. "Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Policy Uncertainty and the Democratic Deficit," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 471-489, July.
  73. Alberto Batinti, 2016. "NIH biomedical funding: evidence of executive dominance in swing-voter states during presidential elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 239-263, September.
  74. Strong, Christine & Yayi, Constant L., 2023. "The political affiliation of central bankers and government debt: Evidence from Africa," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 603-620.
  75. Brooks, Robert & Harris, Mark & Spencer, Christopher, 2007. "An Inflated Ordered Probit Model of Monetary Policy: Evidence from MPC Voting Data," MPRA Paper 8509, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  76. Robert Grafstein, 2000. "Employment, Party Economic Performance, and the Formation of Partisan Preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(3), pages 325-351, July.
  77. Havrilesky, Thomas, 1995. "Restructuring the Fed," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 95-111, May.
  78. Bennani, Hamza & Farvaque, Etienne & Stanek, Piotr, 2018. "Influence of regional cycles and personal background on FOMC members’ preferences and disagreement," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 416-424.
  79. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  80. Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "Government Ideology and Economic Policy-Making in the United States," CESifo Working Paper Series 6444, CESifo.
  81. Rebecca Hellerstein, 2007. "Is There a Dead Spot? New Evidence on FOMC Decisions Before Elections," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(6), pages 1411-1427, September.
  82. Smales, Lee A. & Apergis, Nick, 2016. "The influence of FOMC member characteristics on the monetary policy decision-making process," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 216-231.
  83. Dino Falaschetti, 2003. "Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve," Microeconomics 0311003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  84. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  85. Alexander W. Salter & William J. Luther, 2019. "Adaptation and central banking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 243-256, September.
  86. Caitlin Ainsley, 2022. "Federal reserve appointments and the politics of senate confirmation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 93-110, January.
  87. Christopher Spencer, 2014. "Conventional and Unconventional Votes: A Tale of Three Monetary Policy Committees," Discussion Paper Series 2014_11, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Dec 2014.
  88. Hyunwoo Kim, 2023. "Monetary technocracy and democratic accountability: how central bank independence conditions economic voting," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 939-964, May.
  89. O. David Gulley & Jahangir Sultan, 2011. "Economics, politics and the federal funds markets: does the Fed play politics?," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(14), pages 1005-1019.
  90. Stefan Eichler & Tom Lähner, 2014. "Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 429-453, September.
  91. Stone, Joe A. & Jacobs, David, 2020. "Presidential party affiliation and electoral cycles in the U.S. economy: Evidence from party changes in adjacent terms," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
  92. Sylvester Eijffinger & Ronald Mahieu & Louis Raes, 2016. "Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1628, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  93. Mixon, Franklin Jr. & Upadhyaya, Kamal P., 2004. "Examining legislative challenges to central bank autonomy: macroeconomic and agency costs models," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 415-428.
  94. Keith E. Schnakenberg & Ian R. Turner & Alicia Uribe-McGuire, 2017. "Allies or commitment devices? A model of appointments to the Federal Reserve," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 118-132, July.
  95. Christopher Spencer, 2006. "The Dissent Voting Behaviour of Bank of England MPC Members," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0306, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  96. Conrad, Christian & Hartmann, Matthias, 2019. "On the determinants of long-run inflation uncertainty: Evidence from a panel of 17 developed economies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 233-250.
  97. J.B Crihfield & J.H. Wood, 1995. "Private goals and monetary policy: inflation and resignations from the Federal Reserve Board," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(195), pages 441-460.
  98. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2008. "The macroeconomic effect of external pressures on monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 944, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  99. Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Minority Voting on the Council of Experts: A Politico-Economic Analysis," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(09), pages 37-40, May.
  100. Sutter, Daniel, 1999. "Discretionary policy implementation and reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 249-262, July.
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