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Is the 50-state strategy optimal?
[Ist die 50-Staaten-Strategie optimal?]

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  • Kovenock, Dan
  • Roberson, Brian

Abstract

In 2005, the Democratic National Committee adopted the 50-state strategy in lieu of the strategy of focusing solely on battleground states. The rationale given for this move is that campaign expenditures are durable outlays that impact both current and future campaigns. This paper investigates the optimality of the 50-state strategy in a simple dynamic game of campaign resource allocation in which expenditures act as a form of investment. Neither the 50-state nor the battleground-states strategy is likely to arise in equilibrium. Instead, parties employ a modified battleground-states strategy in which they stochastically target non-battleground states.

Suggested Citation

  • Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2008. "Is the 50-state strategy optimal? [Ist die 50-Staaten-Strategie optimal?]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-16, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200816
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    Cited by:

    1. Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2014. "Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 215-243, January.
    2. Sela, Aner, 2016. "Two-stage contests with effort-dependent rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 11113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen, 2021. "Competitive balance when winning breeds winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 363-384, February.
    4. Aner Sela, 2012. "Sequential two-prize contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 383-395, October.
    5. Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2017. "First-mover advantage in round-robin tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 633-658, March.
    6. Aner Sela, 2021. "Resource Allocations In Multi-Stage Contests," Working Papers 2105, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    7. Iluz, Asaf & Sela, Aner, 2018. "Sequential contests with first and secondary prizes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 6-9.
    8. Esteve-González, Patricia, 2016. "Moral hazard in repeated procurement of services," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 244-269.
    9. Aner Sela, 2023. "Resource allocations in the best-of-k ( $$k=2,3$$ k = 2 , 3 ) contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 235-260, August.
    10. Marco Magnani, 2017. "Electoral competition with ideologically biased voters," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 415-439, July.
    11. Anbarci, Nejat & Cingiz, Kutay & Ismail, Mehmet S., 2023. "Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 94-100.
    12. Malin Arve & Olga Chiappinelli, 2021. "The Role of Budget Constraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(4), pages 1059-1087, October.
    13. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Yue Pan, 2015. "Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2120-2140, July.
    14. Anbarci, Nejat & Cingiz, Kutay & Ismail, Mehmet, 2018. "Multi-Battle n-Player Dynamic Contests," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    15. Noam Cohen & Guy Maor & Aner Sela, 2018. "Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 177-192, December.
    16. Clark, Derek J. & Nilssen, Tore, 2018. "Beating the Matthew Effect: Head Starts and Catching Up in a Dynamic All-Pay Auction," Memorandum 2/2018, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    17. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen & Jan Yngve Sand, 2020. "Gaining advantage by winning contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 23-38, June.
    18. Nejat Anbarc{i} & Kutay Cingiz & Mehmet S. Ismail, 2020. "Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games," Papers 2010.05087, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
    19. Aner Sela, 2017. "Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 253-272, December.
    20. Clark, Derek J. & Nilssen, Tore, 2018. "Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 258-272.
    21. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
    22. Aner Sela & Eyal Erez, 2013. "Dynamic contests with resource constraints," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 863-882, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political campaigns; dynamic contests; elections; all-pay auction; war of attrition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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