IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/wsidps/100.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Zur Interdependenz von Geld- und Lohnpolitik: Makroökonometrische Ex-post und Ex-ante Simulationen verschiedener Szenarien für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Author

Listed:
  • Bartsch, Klaus
  • Hein, Eckhard
  • Truger, Achim

Abstract

Using a macroeconometric model we simulate different scenarios for alternative wage and monetary policies and their effects on macroeconomic performance in Germany. First, ex post scenarios for the period from 1991 until 2000 are simulated, and then ex ante scenarios for the period from 2001 until 2006 will be generated. On the one hand, open economy effects will be taken into account, in particular Germany's integration into the Euro area. On the other hand, interdependencies between monetary and wage policies will be examined.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Bartsch, Klaus & Hein, Eckhard & Truger, Achim, 2001. "Zur Interdependenz von Geld- und Lohnpolitik: Makroökonometrische Ex-post und Ex-ante Simulationen verschiedener Szenarien für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland," WSI Working Papers 100, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wsidps:100
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/50453/1/336749279.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    3. Brian Snowdon & Howard R. Vane & Peter Wynarczyk, 1994. "A Modern Guide To Macroeconomics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 450.
    4. Paul Davidson, 1994. "Post Keynesian Macroeconomic Theory," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 124.
    5. Helge Berger & Jakob De Haan & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, 2001. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
    6. Posen, Adam, 1998. "Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 335-359, July.
    7. Philip Arestis & Fernando Ferrari-Filho & Luiz Fernando de Paula, 2011. "Inflation targeting in Brazil," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 127-148.
    8. Philip Arsetis & Malcolm Sawyer (ed.), 1998. "The Political Economy of Central Banking," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1419.
    9. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    10. Marc Lavoie, 1992. "Foundations of Post-Keynesian Economic Analysis," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 275.
    11. Arestis, Philip & McCauley, Kevin & Sawyer, Malcolm, 2001. "An Alternative Stability Pact for the European Union," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 25(1), pages 113-130, January.
    12. Jorg Bibow, 2001. "Making EMU Work: Some lessons from the 1990s," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 233-259.
    13. Taylor, John B., 1983. "`Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy' by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 123-125.
    14. Manfred Gärtner, 1997. "Central Bank Independence and the Sacrifice Ratio: The Dark Side of the Force," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 133(III), pages 513-538, September.
    15. Roy Cromb, 1993. "A Survey of Recent Econometric Work on the NAIRU," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 20(1/2), pages 27-51, January.
    16. Arestis, Philip, 1996. "Post-Keynesian Economics: Towards Coherence," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 20(1), pages 111-135, January.
    17. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
    18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eckhard Hein & Torsten Niechoj, 2005. "Leitlinien für ein dauerhaftes Wachstum in der EU? Konzept und Wirkung der "Grundzüge der Wirtschaftspolitik"," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 31(1), pages 11-40.
    2. Schulten, Thorsten, 2002. "Europeanisation of collective bargaining: An overview on trade union initiatives for a transnational coordination of collective bargaining policy," WSI Working Papers 101, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hein, Eckhard, 2001. "Institutions and macroeconomic performance: Central bank independence, labour market institutions and the perspectives for inflation and employment in the European Monetary Union," WSI Working Papers 95, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    2. Eckhard Hein, 2002. "Monetary policy and wage bargaining in the EMU: restrictive ECB policies, high unemployment, nominal wage restraint and inflation above the target," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 55(222), pages 299-337.
    3. Jordan, Thomas J., 1999. "Central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 229-255, June.
    4. Hein, Eckhard, 1999. "Zentralbank-Politik und makroökonomische Ergebnisse: eine sozio-institutionelle Interpretation [Central Bank Policies and Macroeconomic Results: A Socio-institutional Interpretation]," MPRA Paper 18881, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Hall, Peter A. & Franzese, Robert J., 1997. "Mixed signals: central bank independence, coordinated wage bargaining, and European Monetary Union," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economic Change and Employment FS I 97-307, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    6. Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2014. "Are public preferences reflected in monetary policy reaction functions?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 60-68.
    7. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
    8. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    9. Berlemann, Michael & Hilscher, Kai, 2010. "Effective monetary policy conservatism: A comparison of 11 OECD countries," HWWI Research Papers 2-21, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    10. MARTÍNEZ-RUIZ, Elena & NOGUES-MARCO, Pilar, 2018. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Stability During the Gold Standard. Spain 1874—1914," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-75, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Stephanos Papadamou & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2017. "Is There a Role for Central Bank Independence on Public Debt Dynamics?," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 7(1), pages 1-6.
    12. Berlemann, Michael & Hielscher, Kai, 2009. "Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism," Working Paper 89/2009, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    13. Doroftei Mădălina & Pătruți Alexandru, 2018. "Central Bank Independence and economic crises: how both the fed and ECB managed to rely on unconventional monetary policies," Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence, Sciendo, vol. 12(1), pages 335-348, May.
    14. CHOI, Jay Pil & FURUSAWA, Taiji, 2018. "Transfer Pricing and the Arm's Length Principle under Imperfect Competition," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-73, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    15. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2010. "What Monetary Policy after the Crisis?," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 499-515.
    16. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    17. Helge Berger & Carsten Hefeker & Ronnie Schöb, 2004. "Optimal Central Bank Conservatism and Monopoly Trade Unions," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(3), pages 585-605, November.
    18. Franz R. Hahn & Peter Mooslechner, 1999. "Zur Fundierung des Designs des Europäischen Zentralbanksystems," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 72(1), pages 49-60, January.
    19. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    20. James Forder, 2000. "Could Reputation-Bias be a Bigger Problem than Inflation-Bias?," Economics Series Working Papers 22, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E64 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Incomes Policy; Price Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E27 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wsidps:100. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/wsihbde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.