IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/vfsc16/145509.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Do politicians gratify core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program

Author

Listed:
  • Kauder, Björn
  • Björn, Kauder
  • Niklas, Potrafke
  • Markus, Reischmann

Abstract

We investigate whether politicians award intergovernmental grants to core supporters. Our new dataset contains information on discretionary project grants from a German state government to municipalities over the period 2008-2011. The results show that discretionary grants were awarded to municipalities with many core supporters of the incumbent state government. Discretionary grants per capita increased by about 1.4 percent when the vote share of the incumbent party in the state election increased by one percentage point. We propose to trim discretionary project grants to the benefit of formula-based grants.

Suggested Citation

  • Kauder, Björn & Björn, Kauder & Niklas, Potrafke & Markus, Reischmann, 2016. "Do politicians gratify core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145509, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145509
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/145509/1/VfS_2016_pid_6307.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Foremny, Dirk & Freier, Ronny & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Yeter, Mustafa, 2014. "Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-099, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Pedro C. Vicente, 2014. "Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(574), pages 356-387, February.
    3. Bracco, Emanuele & Lockwood, Ben & Porcelli, Francesco & Redoano, Michela, 2015. "Intergovernmental grants as signals and the alignment effect: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 78-91.
    4. Carozzi, Felipe & Repetto, Luca, 2016. "Sending the pork home: Birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 42-52.
    5. Grossman, Philip J, 1994. "A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 295-303, March.
    6. Marcelin Joanis, 2011. "The road to power: partisan loyalty and the centralized provision of local infrastructure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 117-143, January.
    7. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
    8. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, 2008. "The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2302-2319, December.
    9. Chris Boone & Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Discretionary Spending: Evidence from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 45(1 (Spring), pages 375-441.
    10. Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February.
    11. Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, 2006. "The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 119-144, January.
    12. Michael Smart, 2007. "Raising taxes through equalization," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1188-1212, November.
    13. Brian Knight, 2008. "Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1785-1803, October.
    14. Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2005. "Voters AS A Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 147-169, April.
    15. Ade, Florian & Freier, Ronny, 2013. "Divided government versus incumbency externality effect—Quasi-experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    16. Worthington, Andrew C & Dollery, Brian E, 1998. "The Political Determination of Intergovernmental Grants in Australia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 299-315, March.
    17. Benny Geys & Jan Vermeir, 2014. "Party Cues In Elections Under Multilevel Governance: Theory And Evidence From Us States," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1029-1058, August.
    18. Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 2002. "On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(1), pages 27-40, March.
    19. David Albouy, 2013. "Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(1), pages 127-141, March.
    20. Cadot, Olivier & Roller, Lars-Hendrik & Stephan, Andreas, 2006. "Contribution to productivity or pork barrel? The two faces of infrastructure investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1133-1153, August.
    21. Buettner, Thiess & Wildasin, David E., 2006. "The dynamics of municipal fiscal adjustment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1115-1132, August.
    22. Paul S. Martin, 2003. "Voting's Rewards: Voter Turnout, Attentive Publics, and Congressional Allocation of Federal Money," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 110-127, January.
    23. Sengupta, Bodhisattva, 2011. "Provision of public goods in a federal economy: The role of party politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 104-119, March.
    24. Curto-Grau, Marta & Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso & Solé-Ollé, Albert, 2012. "Pork-Barrel Politics in Semi-Democracies: The Spanish “Parliamentary Roads,” 1880–1914," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 771-796, August.
    25. Leo Sveikauskas, 1975. "The Productivity of Cities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 89(3), pages 393-413.
    26. Kemmerling, Achim & Stephan, Andreas, 2002. "The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private Productivity and Its Political Economy: Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 403-424, December.
    27. Brollo, Fernanda & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2012. "Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 742-761, November.
    28. Foremny, Dirk & Riedel, Nadine, 2014. "Business taxes and the electoral cycle," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 48-61.
    29. Castells, Antoni & Sole-Olle, Albert, 2005. "The regional allocation of infrastructure investment: The role of equity, efficiency and political factors," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 1165-1205, July.
    30. Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, 2006. "Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 547-569, December.
    31. Roland Hodler & Paul A. Raschky, 2014. "Regional Favoritism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(2), pages 995-1033.
    32. Jennes, Geert & Persyn, Damiaan, 2015. "The effect of political representation on the geographic distribution of income: Evidence using Belgian data," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 178-194.
    33. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529.
    34. Borck, Rainald & Owings, Stephanie, 2003. "The political economy of intergovernmental grants," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 139-156, March.
    35. Case, Anne, 2001. "Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 405-423, March.
    36. Leif Helland & Rune Sørensen, 2009. "Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation: a politico-economic model of Norwegian road projects," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 5-19, April.
    37. Markus Tepe & Pieter Vanhuysse, 2009. "Educational business cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 61-82, April.
    38. Litschig, Stephan, 2012. "Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1047-1060.
    39. Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill H., 2016. "Local favoritism in at-large proportional representation systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 15-26.
    40. Chris Boone & Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Discretionary Spending: Evidence from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 48(1 (Spring), pages 375-441.
    41. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1993. "A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-209, June.
    42. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    43. Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 103-119, January.
    44. Kriner, Douglas L. & Reeves, Andrew, 2015. "Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(1), pages 155-171, February.
    45. Thomas Stratmann & Martin Baur, 2002. "Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems," CESifo Working Paper Series 650, CESifo.
    46. Albert Solé-Ollé, 2013. "Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 229-252, July.
    47. Knight, Brian, 2004. "Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods: evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 845-866, March.
    48. Gist, John R. & Hill, R. Carter, 1984. "Political and economic influences on the bureaucratic allocation of federal funds: The case of Urban Development Action Grants," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 158-172, September.
    49. Anderson, Gary M & Tollison, Robert D, 1991. "Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933-1939," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 161-175, April.
    50. Linda Veiga & Maria Pinho, 2007. "The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 457-477, December.
    51. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Gerber, Alan & Snyder, Jim, 2002. "Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(4), pages 767-777, December.
    52. Aidt, T. S. & Rauh, C., 2017. "The Big Five personality traits and partisanship in England," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1745, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    53. Yusaku Horiuchi & Jun Saito, 2003. "Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 669-682, October.
    54. Brian Knight, 2002. "Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 71-92, March.
    55. Buettner, Thiess & Holm-Hadulla, Fédéric, 2013. "City size and the demand for local public goods," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 16-21.
    56. Atlas, Cary M, et al, 1995. "Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 624-629, June.
    57. Michael Smart, 2007. "Raising taxes through equalization," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(4), pages 1188-1212, November.
    58. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
    59. Banful, Afua Branoah, 2011. "Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 380-390, November.
    60. Jowei Chen, 2010. "The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Barreling in Bicameral Legislatures," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 301-322, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gregor, András, 2020. "Intergovernmental transfers and political competition measured by pivotal probability - Evidence from Hungary," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    2. Yannick Bury & Lars P. Feld & Ekkehard A. Köhler, 2020. "Do Party Ties Increase Transfer Receipts in Cooperative Federalism? - Evidence from Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 8580, CESifo.
    3. Kantorowicz, Jarosław & Köppl–Turyna, Monika, 2019. "Disentangling the fiscal effects of local constitutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 63-87.
    4. Garance Genicot & Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2021. "Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions [“Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures.”]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(6), pages 3154-3206.
    5. Fabio Fiorillo & Elvina Merkaj, 2021. "A comprehensive approach to intergovernmental grants’ tactical allocation. Theory and estimation guidelines," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(4), pages 995-1013, August.
    6. Gonschorek, Gerrit J. & Schulze, Günther G. & Sjahrir, Bambang Suharnoko, 2018. "To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 240-260.
    7. Brice Fabre & Marc Sangnier, 2024. "Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities," Working Papers halshs-04687331, HAL.
    8. Potrafke, Niklas & Roesel, Felix, 2020. "The urban–rural gap in healthcare infrastructure: does government ideology matter?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 54(3), pages 340-351.
    9. Kayode Taiwo, 2022. "Intergovernmental Transfers and Own Revenues of Subnational Governments in Nigeria," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 240(1), pages 31-59, March.
    10. Stephan Schneider & Sven Kunze, 2021. "Disastrous Discretion: Ambiguous Decision Situations Foster Political Favoritism," KOF Working papers 21-491, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    11. Matuszak Piotr & Totleben Bartosz & Piątek Dawid, 2022. "Political alignment and the allocation of the COVID-19 response funds—evidence from municipalities in Poland," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 8(1), pages 50-71, April.
    12. Livert, Felipe & Gainza, Xabier & Acuña, Jose, 2019. "Paving the electoral way: Urban infrastructure, partisan politics and civic engagement," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 1-1.
    13. Geert Jennes, 2021. "Interregional fiscal transfers resulting from central government debt: New insights and consequences for political economy," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(2), pages 196-223, May.
    14. Levoshko, Tamila, 2017. ""Pork-Barrel"-Politik und das regionale Wirtschaftswachstum. Empirische Evidenz für die Ukraine und Polen," Working Papers 0642, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    15. Anastasios Kitsos & Antonios Proestakis, 2021. "Mediating distributive politics: political alignment and electoral business cycle effects on municipality financing in Greece," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 67(1), pages 1-26, August.
    16. Maas, Alexander S. & Lu, Liang, 2020. "“Elections have Consequences”: Partisan Politics are Literally Killing Us," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304457, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    17. Brice Fabre & Marc Sangnier, 2024. "Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities," Institut des Politiques Publiques halshs-04687331, HAL.
    18. Mogge, Lukas & McDonald, Morag & Knoth, Christian & Teickner, Henning & Purevtseren, Myagmartseren & Pebesma, Edzer & Kraehnert, Kati, 2023. "Allocation of humanitarian aid after a weather disaster," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    19. Kayode Taiwo & Linda G. Veiga, 2020. "Is there an “invisible hand” in the formula-based intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria?," NIPE Working Papers 02/2020, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    20. Ilya A. Vaskin, 2020. "Buying Loyalty Of Voters Or Local Elites? Political Alignment And Transfers To Provinces In Tutelary Regimes: The Case Of Iran," HSE Working papers WP BRP 73/PS/2020, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    21. Luisa Schneider & Daniela Wech & Matthias Wrede, 2022. "Political alignment and project funding," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(6), pages 1561-1589, December.
    22. Markus Reischmann, 2016. "Empirical Studies on Public Debt and Fiscal Transfers," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 63.
    23. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Maria Tackett, 2022. "The Effect of Presidential Particularism on Economic Well-Being: A County-Level Analysis," Public Finance Review, , vol. 50(2), pages 135-168, March.
    24. Diogo Baerlocher & Rodrigo Schneider, 2021. "Cold bacon: co-partisan politics in Brazil," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(1), pages 161-182, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kauder, Björn & Potrafke, Niklas & Reischmann, Markus, 2016. "Do politicians reward core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 39-56.
    2. Markus Reischmann, 2016. "Empirical Studies on Public Debt and Fiscal Transfers," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 63.
    3. Gonschorek, Gerrit J. & Schulze, Günther G. & Sjahrir, Bambang Suharnoko, 2018. "To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 240-260.
    4. Levoshko, Tamila, 2017. ""Pork-Barrel"-Politik und das regionale Wirtschaftswachstum. Empirische Evidenz für die Ukraine und Polen," Working Papers 0642, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    5. Luisa Schneider & Daniela Wech & Matthias Wrede, 2022. "Political alignment and project funding," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(6), pages 1561-1589, December.
    6. Josip Glaurdić & Vuk Vuković, 2017. "Granting votes: exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within-between specification for panel data," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 223-241, April.
    7. Albert Solé-Ollé, 2013. "Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 229-252, July.
    8. Stephan Schneider & Sven Kunze, 2021. "Disastrous Discretion: Ambiguous Decision Situations Foster Political Favoritism," KOF Working papers 21-491, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    9. Garance Genicot & Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2021. "Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions [“Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures.”]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(6), pages 3154-3206.
    10. Anastasios Kitsos & Antonios Proestakis, 2021. "Mediating distributive politics: political alignment and electoral business cycle effects on municipality financing in Greece," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 67(1), pages 1-26, August.
    11. Albert Solé-Ollé, 2013. "Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 229-252, July.
    12. Kemmerling, Achim & Stephan, Andreas, 2015. "Comparative political economy of regional transport infrastructure investment in Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 227-239.
    13. Marta Curto‐Grau & Albert Solé‐Ollé & Pilar Sorribas‐Navarro, 2017. "Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?," Working Papers 2017/04, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    14. Albert Solé-Ollé, 2009. "Inter-Regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?," Working Papers 2009/32, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    15. Jean-Francois Maystadt & Muhammad Kabir Salihu, 2015. "National or political cake?," Working Papers 100756558, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    16. Jennes, Geert & Persyn, Damiaan, 2015. "The effect of political representation on the geographic distribution of income: Evidence using Belgian data," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 178-194.
    17. Emilie Caldeira, 2012. "Does the System of Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers in Senegal Eliminate Politically Motivated Targeting?," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 21(2), pages 167-191, March.
    18. Marta Curto-Grau (Universitat de Barcelona) & Albert Sole-Olle (Universitat de Barcelona) & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro(Universitat de Barcelona), 2012. "Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain," Working Papers in Economics 288, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    19. Brice Fabre, 2017. "Political Colleagues Matter: The Impact of Multiple Office-Holding on Intergovernmental Grants," PSE Working Papers halshs-01596149, HAL.
    20. Halse, Askill H., 2016. "More for everyone: The effect of local interests on spending on infrastructure," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 41-56.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfsocea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.