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Commitment Problems and War in International Bargaining

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  • Amann, Erwin
  • Leonhardt, Nadine

Abstract

In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if the relative bargaining position changes substantially.

Suggested Citation

  • Amann, Erwin & Leonhardt, Nadine, 2013. "Commitment Problems and War in International Bargaining," Ruhr Economic Papers 403, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:403
    DOI: 10.4419/86788458
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Powell, Robert, 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 169-203, January.
    2. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; commitment problems; shifts in power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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