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Common law and the origin of shareholder protection

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  • Acheson, Graeme G.
  • Campbell, Gareth
  • Turner, John D.

Abstract

This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules. Ultimately, the matter of protection was one for the corporation and its shareholders. Using c. 500 articles of association and ownership records of publicly-traded Victorian corporations, we find that corporations afforded investors with just as much protection as is present in modern corporate law and that firms with better shareholder protection had more diffuse ownership.

Suggested Citation

  • Acheson, Graeme G. & Campbell, Gareth & Turner, John D., 2016. "Common law and the origin of shareholder protection," QUCEH Working Paper Series 2016-04, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:qucehw:201604
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    Cited by:

    1. Turner, John D., 2017. "The development of English company law before 1900," QUCEH Working Paper Series 2017-01, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
    2. Moortgat, Leentje & Annaert, Jan & Deloof, Marc, 2017. "Investor protection, taxation and dividend policy: Long-run evidence, 1838–2012," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 113-131.
    3. Jansson, Walter, 2018. "Stock markets, banks and economic growth in the UK, 1850–1913," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 263-296, December.
    4. Maung, Min & Wilson, Craig & Yu, Weisu, 2020. "Does reputation risk matter? Evidence from cross-border mergers and acquisitions," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    5. Holderness, Clifford G., 2018. "Equity issuances and agency costs: The telling story of shareholder approval around the world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 415-439.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    law and finance; ADRI; shareholder protection; corporate ownership; common law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N83 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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